impact of climate change in pakistan essay

• climate change

Pakistan Must Adapt to Climate Change. But Who Will Help Us?

T he record-breaking mega-flood in August 2022 that impacted 33 million people in Pakistan brought home to the world the urgency and scale of the climate crisis afflicting developing countries. At the 27th United Nations Climate Change conference (COP 27), it triggered widespread worry among other countries about the state of preparedness many will have to gear up to—even if, like Pakistan, they remain negligible emitters of the greenhouse gases. In 2022, Pakistan’s pavilion at Sharm-al-Shaikh positioned not just the global connectedness of the crisis by pointing out that “what goes on in Pakistan will not stay in Pakistan,” it also became the hub of the climate finance deficits that are growing exponentially in inverse proportion to global emissions. This has led, in part, to the creation of the Loss and Damage (L&D) fund at the end of the conference.

Yet as G20’s energy ministers remained unable to agree on a roadmap to reduce emissions by July 2023 (even as COP28 approaches) the realization set in that many of us will remain in the frontline of the burn. Pakistan has been home for three successive years where on at least one day temperatures reached 53°C (127.4°F). The hope that we were working with needed a home-grown plan. As heatwaves coupled with slow global action transformed the earth into a red planet in the summer of 2023, Pakistan launched a National Adaptation Plan in July to chart a strategic whole-of government approach with a framework toolkit that allows it to protect its population.

For instance, the province of Sindh, which to this day stands transformed by the 2022 deluge, and recently saw evacuations in the coastal areas from cyclonic activity in a warming Arabian Sea, began its rehabilitation process by transferring new land titles to the women of afflicted households. In all such crises, the most vulnerable always remain the poorest, the women and children, impacted disproportionately by multiple crises of food insecurity, displacement, and disease.

That said, while Sindh is struggling to cope with a cascade of disasters, it will need not just the National Adaptation Plan, but the resources to transform municipal, rural, and agri-water governance for the dangerous decade ahead—all of which needs time, capacity, and liquidity. Similarly, the province of Balochistan has already declared a flood emergency, while the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is impacted too by a gathering storm.

Read More: ‘I Lost My Son in This Water a Few Days Ago.’ Photos of Pakistan’s Catastrophic Flooding

For countries drowning in extreme weather, exogenous shocks, and high public debt, where will this money come from? Especially in the amount that the World Bank in its 2022 Country Climate and Development Report calculated for Pakistan: a staggering $348 billion by 2030. This is just the number to stay resilient—to keep our heads above water and build sustainability into a climate-adaptive future. All this while a summer of fresh flooding and melting glaciers redefines our lives, our social and economic experiences, into a lifelong struggle to rebuild with resilience while we fight the climate devastations wreaking havoc again.

Who is coming to the rescue of such countries? While U.N. has been in the frontline of immediate relief, even its flash appeals globally remain under-funded. Structural reforms involve pain. We are willing to undergo more pain, especially for enabling resilience, but some amount of change has to come from the Bretton Woods system—the monetary management structure that controls the U.S., Canada, Australia, Western Europe, and Japan—meant to lead the world out of egregious inequality and now climate distress. The financing gap to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in developing countries has enlarged from $2.5 trillion in 2019 to $4.2 trillion in 2023. Add to it the cost of realizing climate goals, and the amount reaches a whopping $5.2 trillion annually .

Our National Adaption Plan (NAP) is designed to build climate-adaptation goals into every aspect of development planning. The international financial system must do the same. As we approach COP 28, the Global Goal on Adaptation remains under-capitalized, while the L&D fund is yet to start functioning. The U.N. Secretary General António Guterres made detailed recommendations in a press conference on July 27 that countries must operationalize and scale up the funding of renewables. Donor countries have been bilaterally supportive but they too need to fulfill their commitment to provide 0.7% of their Gross National Income as development assistance. Multilateral Development Banks should be recapitalized and be enabled to provide portfolio and budgetary support to developing countries, rather than project finance only. They should vastly expand grant and concessional lending to developing countries, enhance the vote and the voice of the developing countries in both International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and link the distribution of new IMF SDRs to development and climate goals.

The transition to a sustainable global economy will require an investment of around $1.5 trillion each year in the developing countries. Business as usual will certainly not work. A large part of this funding pool will have to come from the private sector, which will need new structural incentives to bring their leverage and capital to the business of bending development history. Vulnerable countries cannot attract investment in times of epochal climate distress, but they do need more than band-aid financing. We now need transformational milestones to building global consensus for a financing architecture that can face the 21st century’s rapidly changing conditions that challenge resilience while fueling crippling inequalities.

Critical assistance for the most climate vulnerable countries must not further burden the poor. Actions will be as important as pledges and plans at this point. A real message of change from global leaders would contribute substantially to the success of the forthcoming SDG Summit in September and COP28 in December, and restore trust in global cooperation and international solidarity. Our people are looking to us with renewed hope for action. We must not fail them.

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Turning Concern into Action: Understanding Climate Change Attitudes in Pakistan

Juan d. barón.

Pakistan is grappling with the profound impacts of climate change, such as shifting weather patterns and catastrophic floods (Baron et all, 2022) . Unfortunately, these impacts are projected to escalate, with forecasts suggesting that climate-related events, environmental degradation, and air pollution may cause Pakistan's GDP to shrink by 18-20% by 2050 . This alarming statistic underscores the need to address climate change and mitigate its effects on people and their livelihoods. Even though developing countries like Pakistan may not be the primary contributors to climate change, acknowledging and confronting its fallout is indispensable, especially for combatting pressing local issues like air pollution and smog.

The necessity to adapt and the implications of actions for local issues make it essential to understand people's prioritization of addressing climate change, their trusted sources of information, and the motivating factors behind their actions. To answer these questions, we conducted a phone survey of a random sample of 2,000 parents in Pakistan who have access to a cell phone and have school-aged children using random digit dialing. The key findings have been released in a recent policy note .

The results of the survey show that most people, regardless of gender or education level, are highly concerned about the impact of climate change on children, with over 80 percent expressing concern. The survey shows that although people are worried about climate change and its effects, it is not always their top priority. When asked to choose the top three issues facing Pakistan, less than a quarter of participants chose climate change. This suggests that while people are worried about climate change, it may not be their priority issue.

In the survey, when a random subset of people were presented with economic issues first, there was a 4-percentage point (statistically significant) rise in the likelihood of individuals considering climate change among top three issues of Pakistan, compared to when social issues were presented first. This prioritization of climate change when seen as an economic issue is more pronounced among individuals with higher educational attainment (see Figure 1).

How knowledgeable are people about climate information and whom do they trust?

The survey looked at people's knowledge of and trust in different sources of information about climate change. Those with higher levels of education are more informed about climate change.  For example, only 47 percent of illiterate people believe that the earth is getting warmer due to human activity, compared to 60 percent of those with higher education or above. Findings also show significant distrust overall in traditional sources of information, with the least educated being the most likely to distrust these sources. Among these sources, news media leads as the most important source of information while less than 1/5 trust scientists. This highlights the lack of trust in traditional climate change leadership, including the possibility of misinformation from the media. This poses a significant challenge to educating people about climate change.

How are people addressing climate change in Pakistan?

Families want their children to learn about climate change, but they are relying on the schools to fulfill this role. Almost all households in the survey said they support education about climate in schools.  However, less than half talk about it at home. This shows that schools could play a role in promoting conversations and educating families about climate change.

The survey reveals that, despite frequently adopting money-saving measures such as turning off lights (76%) to combat climate change, people exhibit less enthusiasm for endorsing more impactful actions like using public transport (36%) or cutting down on meat consumption. Reducing the disconnect between concern and action requires understanding people's beliefs e.g. education and awareness campaigns highlighting practical benefits, like savings or health improvements.

Three crucial insights emerge from the survey findings for policymakers. Firstly, economic aspects drive people's concern about climate change. Secondly, skepticism exists, especially among less educated individuals relying on traditional information sources. Lastly, even concerned individuals might not act due to inconvenience or lifestyle changes. Policymakers should focus on removing barriers and offering economic incentives to encourage active participation in climate action.

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Pakistan Urgently Needs Significant Investments in Climate Resilience to Secure its Economy and Reduce Poverty

ISLAMABAD, November 10, 2022 —This year’s heatwave and devastating floods are a reminder that climate change-induced disasters can significantly set back Pakistan’s development ambitions and its ability to reduce poverty. These disasters have caused more than 1,700 deaths and displaced more than 8 million people. The damage to infrastructure, assets, crops, and livestock has also been massive, with more than $30 billion in damages and economic losses. The World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) for Pakistan released today concludes that the country needs fundamental shifts in its development path and policies, requiring substantial investments in people-centric climate adaptation and resilience, that will require international support.

“The recent flooding and humanitarian crisis provide a wake-up call for urgent action to prevent further devastation to the people of Pakistan and its economy due to climate change,” said Martin Raiser, World Bank Vice President for South Asia. “Accelerated climate actions can protect the economy from shocks and secure more sustainable and inclusive growth in Pakistan.”

The CCDR notes that the combined risks of extreme climate-related events, environmental degradation, and air pollution are projected to reduce Pakistan’s GDP by at least 18 to 20% by 2050. This will stall progress on economic development and poverty reduction.

“If we want to tackle climate change, we need to prioritize investing in adaptation to help prepare Pakistan for future climate-related calamities, which are growing in frequency and intensity,” said Hela Cheikhrouhou, IFC Regional Vice President for Middle East, Central Asia, Türkiye, Afghanistan and Pakistan . “ With the right policy frameworks, Pakistan has the opportunity to attract private investment to build its resilience, particularly in sectors such as water management, agriculture, urban infrastructure, municipal services, and housing.”

To improve adaptation to climate change and avoid high costs, the report recommends five priority transitions:

1. Transforming the Agri-Food System: Productivity in the agri-food system – the largest employer, particularly for poor and vulnerable households – has been plummeting due to the degradation of land, overuse of chemical inputs and water, and lack of research. And yields are projected to drop another 50% by 2050. To bolster rural incomes and strengthen food and water security, Pakistan needs to repurpose environmentally damaging subsidies, promote climate-smart and regenerative agriculture and livestock systems, and prioritize ecosystem restoration.

2. Building Resilient and Livable Cities: Pakistan’s population living in urban areas, already highly exposed to pollution and climate change, will increase from 37% in 2020 to 60% in 2050. To ensure cities become more liveable, urgent reforms are needed for more integrated land use planning and increased investments in municipal services and in energy efficiency and clean transportation. To this end, strong municipal governments, and the expansion of city finances via property taxation are critical.

3. Accelerating a Just Transition to Sustainable Energy and Low-carbon Transport: The energy sector is a critical enabler of economic development and poverty reduction. However, it is a huge drain on public finances and foreign exchange reserves and a major contributor to GHG emissions. Pakistan must prioritize reducing the cost of generation including through energy efficiency, ensuring cost-reflective tariffs and improved targeting of subsidies, while addressing technical and collection losses in transmission and distribution. Scaled-up investment in mass transit can avoid locking in highly polluting modes of transport.

4. Strengthening Human Capital to Achieve Sustained and Equitable Development and Climate Resilience: To address its human capital crisis, Pakistan needs to improve the management of water, sanitation, and hygiene, which is the main driver of child stunting, and reduce high fertility rates. Pakistan should also ensure universal access to quality education and expand its social-protection system by improving benefits, particularly for those at the highest risk.

5. Aligning Financing Policies, Incentives, and Institutions to Support Scale-up of Climate Actions: Implementing these policies and executing a climate-resilient and low-carbon development agenda will require total investment needs that amount to around 10% of the cumulative GDP up to 2030. Accelerating the ongoing reforms to expand domestic revenue mobilization, including raising new municipal and property taxes, as well as improving efficiency and targeting of subsidies for agriculture and energy while protecting the most vulnerable will help to finance a large part of the needed investments. Yet, this will not be enough. A comprehensive financing strategy, involving greater private sector involvement and significant international support will be essential to complement Pakistan’s own commitment towards resilient and inclusive development.

“Foreign private capital can play an important role in addressing the climate change challenges in Pakistan,”  said   Ethiopis Tafara, MIGA Vice President and Chief Risk, Legal and Administrative Officer.  “Sustaining flows of foreign direct investment that support climate mitigation and adaptation will contribute toward financing Pakistan’s low-carbon transition.”

Pakistan is not a significant contributor to global warming, but it is on a high-growth trajectory of carbon emissions linked to fossil fuel use. This is also a source of the country’s chronic fiscal stress and worsening air pollution. Therefore, climate actions that bring co-benefits to both adaptation and mitigation and contribute to improving development outcomes should have the highest priority.

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World Bank Group Country Climate and Development Reports

The World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) are new core diagnostic reports that integrate climate change and development considerations. They will help countries prioritize the most impactful actions that can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and boost adaptation, while delivering on broader development goals. CCDRs build on data and rigorous research and identify main pathways to reduce GHG emissions and climate vulnerabilities, including the costs and challenges as well as benefits and opportunities from doing so. The reports suggest concrete, priority actions to support a low-carbon, resilient transition. As public documents, CCDRs aim to inform governments, citizens, the private sector, and development partners, and enable engagement with the development and climate agenda. CCDRs will feed into other core Bank Group diagnostics, country engagements and operations, and help attract funding and direct financing for high-impact climate action.

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In a First Study of Pakistan’s Floods, Scientists See Climate Change at Work

A growing field called attribution science is helping researchers rapidly assess the links between global warming and weather disasters.

By Raymond Zhong

Pakistan began receiving abnormally heavy rain in mid-June, and, by late August, drenching downpours were declared a national emergency. The southern part of the Indus River , which traverses the length of the country, became a vast lake. Villages have become islands , surrounded by putrid water that stretches to the horizon. More than 1,500 people have died. Floodwaters could take months to recede.

The deluges were made worse by global warming caused by greenhouse-gas emissions, scientists said Thursday, drawing upon a fast-growing field of research that gauges the influence of climate change on specific extreme weather events soon after they occur — and while societies are still dealing with their shattering consequences.

As climate scientists’ techniques improve, they can assess, with ever-greater confidence and specificity, how human-induced changes in Earth’s chemistry are affecting the severe weather outside our windows, adding weight and urgency to questions about how nations should adapt.

The floods in Pakistan are the deadliest in a recent string of eye-popping weather extremes across the Northern Hemisphere: relentless droughts in the Horn of Africa , Mexico and China ; flash floods in West and Central Africa , Iran and the inland United States ; searing heat waves in India , Japan , California , Britain and Europe .

Scientists have warned for decades that some kinds of extreme weather are becoming more frequent and intense as more heat-trapping gases get pumped into the atmosphere. As the planet warms, more water evaporates from the oceans. Hotter air also holds more moisture. So storms like those that come with the South Asian monsoon can pack a bigger punch.

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Human, economic, environmental toll of climate change on the rise: WMO

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The relentless advance of climate change brought more drought, flooding and heatwaves to communities around the world last year, compounding threats to people’s lives and livelihoods, the UN’s World Meteorological Organization ( WMO ) said on Friday.

WMO latest State of the Global Climate report shows that the last eight years were the eight warmest on record , and that sea level rise and ocean warming hit new highs . Record levels of greenhouse gases caused “planetary scale changes on land, in the ocean and in the atmosphere”.

World Meteorological Organization April 21, 2023

The organization says its report, released ahead of this year’s Mother Earth Day , echoes UN Secretary-General António Guterres ’ call for “ deeper, faster emissions cuts to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degree Celsius”, as well as “ massively scaled-up investments in adaptation and resilience, particularly for the most vulnerable countries and communities who have done the least to cause the crisis”.

WMO Secretary-General, Prof. Petteri Taalas, said that amid rising greenhouse gas emissions and a changing climate, “populations worldwide continue to be gravely impacted by extreme weather and climate events ”. He stressed that last year, “continuous drought in East Africa, record breaking rainfall in Pakistan and record-breaking heatwaves in China and Europe affected tens of millions, drove food insecurity, boosted mass migration, and cost billions of dollars in loss and damage.”

WMO highlights the importance of investing in climate monitoring and early warning systems to help mitigate the humanitarian impacts of extreme weather. The report also points out that today, improved technology makes the transition to renewable energy “cheaper and more accessible than ever” .

Warmest years on record

The State of the Global Climate report complements the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC ) Sixth Assessment report released a month ago, which includes data up to 2020.

WMO’s new figures show that global temperatures have continued to rise, making the years 2015 to 2022 the eight warmest ever since regular tracking started in 1850. WMO notes that this was despite three consecutive years of a cooling La Niña climate pattern.

WMO says concentrations of the three main greenhouse gases, which trap heat in the atmosphere – carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide – reached record highs in 2021, which is the latest year for which consolidated data is available , and that there are indications of a continued increase in 2022.

Indicators ‘off the charts’

According to the report, “melting of glaciers and sea level rise - which again reached record levels in 2022 - will continue to up to thousands of years ”. WMO further highlights that “Antarctic sea ice fell to its lowest extent on record and the melting of some European glaciers was, literally, off the charts”.

Sea level rise, which threatens the existence of coastal communities and sometimes entire countries, has been fuelled not only by melting glaciers and ice caps in Greenland and Antarctica, but also by the expansion of the volume of oceans due to heat. WMO notes that ocean warming has been “particularly high in the past two decades”.

Deadly consequences

The report examines the many socio-economic impacts of extreme weather, which have wreaked havoc in the lives of the most vulnerable around the world . Five consecutive years of drought in East Africa, in conjunction with other factors such as armed conflict, have brought devastating food insecurity to 20 million people across the region.

Extensive flooding in Pakistan caused by severe rainfall in July and August last year killed over 1,700 people, while some 33 million were affected. WMO highlights that total damage and economic losses were assessed at $30 billion, and that by October 2022, around 8 million people had been internally displaced by the floods.

The report also notes that in addition to putting scores of people on the move, throughout the year, hazardous climate and weather-related events “worsened conditions” for many of the 95 million people already living in displacement .

Threat to ecosystems

Environmental impacts of climate change are another focus of the report, which highlights a shift in recurring events in nature, “such as when trees blossom, or birds migrate”. The flowering of cherry trees in Japan has been tracked since the ninth century, and in 2021 the date of the event was the earliest recorded in 1,200 years .

As a result of such shifts, entire ecosystems can be upended . WMO notes that spring arrival times of over a hundred European migratory bird species over five decades “show increasing levels of mismatch to other spring events”, such as the moment when trees produce leaves and insects take flight, which are important for bird survival.

The report says these mismatches “are likely to have contributed to population decline in some migrant species , particularly those wintering in sub-Saharan Africa”, and to the ongoing destruction of biodiversity.

Ending the ‘war on nature’

In his message on Earth Day, UN chief Mr. Guterres warned that “ biodiversity is collapsing as one million species teeter on the brink of extinction ”, and called on the world to end its “relentless and senseless wars on nature”, insisting that “we have the tools, the knowledge, and the solutions” to address climate change.

Last month, Mr. Guterres convened an Advisory Panel of top UN agency officials, private sector and civil society leaders, to help fast track a global initiative aiming to protect all countries through life-saving early warning systems by 2027. Stepped up coordinated action was announced, initially in 30 countries particularly vulnerable to extreme weather, including Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries.

Early Warnings for All

WMO Secretary-General Prof. Petteri Taalas said on Friday that some one hundred countries currently do not have adequate weather services in place, and that the UN Early Warnings for All Initiative “ aims to fill the existing capacity gap to ensure that every person on earth is covered by early warning services”.

Mr. Taalas explained that “achieving this ambitious task requires improvement of observation networks, investments in early warning, hydrological and climate service capacities.” He also stressed the effectiveness of collaboration among UN agencies in addressing humanitarian impacts of climate events, especially in reducing mortality and economic losses. 

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Resilience, Environment and Climate Change

The cumulative effects of climate change directly impact the economy, costing the country an estimated USD 38 billion annually (WB and ADB 2021). If this trend continues, it will reverse human development gains made over the last decade. Already, in 2020 Pakistan ranked 154 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index, down two places from 152 the previous year.

Addressing the threats posed by climate change is a priority for the UNDP. At the same time, Pakistan recognizes that climate change affects everyone differently and that narrowing the gender gap is essential to building climate preparedness and resilience for all. If Pakistan is to tackle the climate challenges that lie ahead, it cannot do so without all stakeholders' full and equal participation.

people in GB

accessed health services – 17,825 youth, 250 people in extreme poverty, 1385 women, 27 people with disabilities

of land in Sindh freed of encroachment and brought under the control of the forest department

spoke up about their needs through the Youth Conversations platform

Climate Resilience

Weather-related disasters have become frequent, intense, and unpredictable leading to the destruction of lives, vital infrastructures, homes, and businesses, making climate change threatening and catastrophic. Severe droughts are stifling rural livelihoods. Rising sea levels put low-lying areas at risk of floods. Ecosystems are being fragmented or eliminated, and many species are in decline or being pushed into extinction. These frequent and unpredictable changes in weather conditions severely affect food security, livelihoods, health, clean water, energy, medicines, and other ecosystem services for people, especially the marginalized and vulnerable communities, given their limited ability to cope. The level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would have to be reduced by 45 percent by 2030 to prevent global warming above 1.5C. As per the worldwide climate index, Pakistan ranks 8th most vulnerable country to the impacts of climate change. The variability in climate and weather patterns has increased the frequency of disasters which undermines development in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan's economy remains highly vulnerable to future threats posed by climate change. 

Addressing the threats posed by climate change is a priority for UNDP. At the same time, UNDP recognizes that climate change affects everyone differently and that narrowing the inequalities is essential to building climate preparedness and resilience for all. If the country is to tackle the climate challenges that lie ahead, it cannot do so without all stakeholders' full and equal participation. 

UNDP is also working closely with the government to explore the potential of Blue Economy in Pakistan.

Institutional and Policy Support

To steer Pakistan toward inclusive and resilient climate development, UNDP is implementing projects to assist the Government of Pakistan in environmental sustainability at the national, provincial, and local levels by moving forward with its multiple thematic areas. 

UNDP focuses on to help governments accelerate progress on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by providing tools that will help identify critical constraints to progress and focus on development objectives that are more relevant to Pakistan's context. Furthermore, UNDP provides support to the Government of Pakistan and offers an integrated package of policy support services that are aligned with its programming priorities. Policy support covers a wide range of areas, including climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, access to sustainable energy, sustainable management of terrestrial ecosystems, oceans governance, and promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies, poverty reduction, inclusive growth and productive employment, gender equality and the empowerment of women, and health access to water and sanitation. 

UNDP is strengthening and enabling the Government of Pakistan to strategize NDC planning, relevant policies, and its implementation. Furthermore, UNDP has also aided the government in developing, revising, and implementing its National Climate Change policy. 

Circular Economy/ Solid Waste Management 

The UNDP promotes a circular economy-based approaches to the existing waste value chain. Instead of waste being collected for disposal only, the UNDP facilitates diverting major chunk of the accumulated trash from disposal sites towards various recycling practices. The UNDP creates multiple links currently missing in the value chain: recycling points, where the waste will be sorted for subsequent recycling, and composting facilities. The UNDP will also research and operationalize new recycling technologies to strengthen existing recycling industries. Successful pilot models with the private sector have been initiated.

Protected Area Management and Eco-Tourism

UNDP seeks to contribute to long-term global environmental impacts, including the recovery of wildlife populations, habitat conservation, and agro-biodiversity by managing protected areas. To counter the threats to biodiversity and overcome the barriers to effective management of protected areas, UNDP support the government in various initiatives that enhances its capacity for biodiversity conservation and effective protected area management; it also includes the implementation of various measures to reduce the illegal wildlife trade and poaching. 

In the past, UNDP has worked extensively on protected area management to develop a system in the face of emerging challenges, including climate change threats, rising demands for tourism, increasing demand for natural resource goods and services, and the recognition of customary practices in protected areas. One of the critical interventions was the delineation, mapping, and management planning for the biodiversity corridor between the two national parks, the CKNP (Central Karakoram National Park) and DNP (Deosai National Park); the first of its kind in Pakistan. 

Furthermore, UNDP collaborates with the local community and support local organizations to provide alternate livelihood options in the form of improved climate resilient farming, water management practices, better livestock and pastures, and the capacity building of stakeholder institutions.

Climate Promise - II

Glaciers and Students

Balochistan SDGs (BSDG) Accelerated Delivery

Accelerated response to HIV through effective prevention, treatment, care and support interventions for Key Populations and surveillance in high-risk areas

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Reforms And Innovation In Government For High Performance

Stabilization and Inclusive Development Programme (SIDP)

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Your right to know Saturday, August 24, 2024

Perspectives

Climate change: causes, outcomes in Pakistan and a way forward

September 24, 2019

Climate change can generally be defined as a change in global or regional climate patterns. In particular, it is the change apparent from the mid-to-late 20th century onwards, and attributed largely to the increased levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide produced by the use of fossil fuels. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: “A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”

Human activities are the major cause of climate change. The foremost cause is global warming. Burning fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, has increased the concentration of carbon dioxide. Due to expansion of the greenhouse effect, global warming has risen. As per this phenomenon, gases such as water vapors, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons in the our atmosphere prevents the heat to leave the earth’s atmosphere; resultantly, the ozone layer depletes and the temperature rises.

In its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that there is a more than 95 percent probability that human activities over the past 50 years have warmed our planet. Industrial activities that our modern civilisation depends upon have raised atmospheric carbon dioxide levels from 280 parts per million to 400 parts per million in the last 150 years. The panel also concluded there is a better than 95 percent probability that human-produced greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have caused much of the observed increase in earth’s temperatures over the past 50 years. About half of the CO2 emissions, between 1750 and 2010, have occurred in the last 40 years.

Deforestation and increase in the use of chemicals in domestic and agriculture life is another reason of climate change. Deforestation is the second leading cause of global warming and produces about 24 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Scientists say that deforestation in tropical rainforests adds more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere than the sum total of all the cars and trucks on the world’s roads.

The surge in the uses of chemicals in domestic as well as in agriculture, in the shape of fertilisers, also plays its role in climate change. The high rate of application of nitrogen-rich fertilisers has effects on the heat storage of cropland (nitrogen oxides have 300 times more heat-trapping capacity per unit of volume than carbon dioxide) and the run-off of excess fertilizers creates ‘dead zones’ in our oceans. In addition to these effects, high nitrate levels in groundwater due to over fertilization are cause for concern for human health.

These causes resulted in climate change and have a perilous aftermath. In this regard, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created by the United Nations Environment Programme (UN Environment) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in 1988. It now engages with 195 member countries, which provides policymakers with regular scientific assessments on climate change, its implications and potential future risks, as well as to put forward adaptation and mitigation options.

The foremost hazardous evidence is the rise of carbon dioxide in out atmosphere. As per NASA’s scientific evidence, for a millennium, the level of carbon dioxide (parts per million) was below 300, which started to rise since 1950, and is now above 400. Secondly, as per NASA’s evidence, the planet’s average surface temperature has risen about 1.62 degrees Fahrenheit (0.9 degrees Celsius) since the late 19th century, a change driven largely by increased carbon dioxide and other human-made emissions into the atmosphere. Most of the warming occurred in the past 35 years, with the five warmest years on record taking place since 2010. This is also established by the United Nations’ report, prepared by the World Meteorological Organisation, on September 22, 2019. It states that the period “is currently estimated to be 1.1 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial era of 1850-1900, and 0.2 degrees Celsius warmer than 2011-2015”.

Thirdly, the oceans are getting warmer, and ice sheets are shrinking. As per NASA, the oceans have absorbed much of this increased heat, with the top 700 meters (about 2,300 feet) of ocean showing warming of more than 0.4 degrees Fahrenheit since 1969. The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have decreased and have lost an average of 286 billion tons of ice per year between 1993 and 2016, while Antarctica lost about 127 billion tons of ice per year during the same time period. The rate of Antarctica ice mass loss has tripled in the last decade.

Fourthly, the glaciers are melting and sea level is rising. Around the globe, the glaciers are retreating including in the Alps, Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, Alaska and Africa. The global sea level rose about eight inches in the last century. The rate in the last two decades, however, is nearly double that of the last century and is accelerating slightly every year.

There are other drastic evidences of climate change. Arctic sea ice is declining rapidly. Disturbed rainfalls and extreme weather events have increased. Also, the ocean acidification, which has increased by about 30 percent since the Industrial Revolution, is another evidence of climate change. It also has a negative impact on crop yield productions. The direct impact on the lives of humans is on the vulnerable and the marginalised segment of society.

As per NASA, 97 percent of climate scientists agree that climate-warming trends over the past century are very likely due to human activities

As per IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, numerous risks are involved that raise concern. These include risk of death, injuries, health or disturbed livelihoods due to storms, flooding and sea-level rise. The risk in water supply, supply of electricity and emergency situations are also there. The foremost risk is food insecurity due to droughts, flooding, and precipitation variability. There is the risk to lose marine and coastal ecosystems and biodiversity as well.

Although Pakistan is not much contributing in global warming and climate change, yet it is the seventh most affected country. The Global Change Impact Studies Centre of Pakistan shows that the mean annual temperature has increased in the recent past with greater increase in Sindh and Balochistan. During the last century, the average temperature over Pakistan has increased by 0.6°C, which is in conformity with the increase of the average global temperature. Future climate change projections, based on all four IPCC-AR5 RCPs scenarios, show that the average rise in temperature over Pakistan, by the end of the century, will be about 1°C higher compared to the global average. This increase, particularly in temperature, is associated with a number of adverse impacts, including the increasing frequency of extreme events (floods, droughts, heat waves, and cyclonic activity), steady regression of most glaciers (except a small minority in the Karakorum Range) that supply the bulk of the country’s water supply and changes in the rainfall patterns.

Pakistan’s water cycle is the primary affected area of climate change. Agriculture is one of the major sectors likely to be adversely affected by climate change. Climate change can disrupt food availability, reduce access to food, and affect food quality. Projected increases in temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, changes in extreme weather events, and reductions in water availability may all result in reduced agricultural productivity. Seasonal smog is also due to climate change and pollution.

Pakistan has also suffered economically due to climate change. According to experts, Pakistan has faced around 150 freak weather incidents as a result of climate change in the past 20 years: flash floods, smog in winter, forest fires in summer, melting glaciers, freaky heatwaves, landslides, displaced population. During the floods in 2010-11, almost 10 percent of Pakistan’s population was displaced in two provinces, one in the north and another in the south. Last year, the cost of extreme weather as a consequence of climate change was listed at $384 million; in the past 20 years, there has been a cost of almost two billion dollars to the national economy because of the ravages of climate change.

The writing is on the wall. The world is responding to the danger now. Greta Thunberg, a teenage Swedish environment activist, shookup the top leaders with a Global Climate Strike call on September 20, 2019, through which the protest was recorded in around 150 countries, in more than 4,500 places.

The UN has shown its commitment to fight in this noble cause. There are various agreements and protocols for climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main international agreement on climate action. It was one of the three conventions adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. To date, it has been ratified by 195 countries. It started as a way for countries to work together to limit global temperature increases and climate change, and to cope with their impacts.

In the mid-1990s, the UNFCCC signatories realised that stronger provisions were needed to reduce emissions. In this regard, they agreed to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which introduced legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries. Next comes the Paris Agreement; the Paris climate conference took place from November 30 to December 11, 2015. On December 12, the parties reached a new global agreement on climate change. The agreement presents a balanced outcome with an action plan to limit global warming ‘well below’ two degree Celsius. There is also the Montreal Protocol 1987, which is a global agreement to protect the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances. There is also the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 1994 to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought/ desertification.

What requires is that we must change course by 2020, as the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterreshas said; we risk missing the point where we can avoid the “disastrous consequences for people and all the natural systems that sustain us.”

In this regard, there are the following suggestions to tackle global warming. Dramatically reducing our use of fossil fuels, especially carbon-intensive coal, is essential to tackle climate change. There are many ways to begin this process. Key action steps include: not building any new coal-burning power plants, initiating a phased shutdown of coal plants starting with the oldest and dirtiest, and capturing and storing carbon emissions from power plants. While it may sound like science fiction, the technology exists to store carbon emissions underground.

Taken together with the tropical deforestation, emissions from agriculture represent nearly 30 percent of the world’s heat-trapping emissions. We can fight global warming by reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and by making our food production practices more sustainable.

Using alternative sources of energy is more efficient and meets the problem of global warming. Energy producing from solar, wind, tidal, and biomass are more clean and renewable. There are least effects if we produce electricity from the alternative sources of energy. Nuclear power results in a few global warming emissions; an increased share of nuclear power in the energy mix could help reduce global warming.

A successful global compact on climate change must include financial assistance from richer countries to poorer countries to help make the transition to low-carbon development pathways and to help adapt to the impacts of climate change. The energy used to power, heat, and cool our homes, businesses, and industries are the single largest contributor to global warming. Energy efficiency technologies are the dire need of the hour.

Transportation sector’s emissions have increased at a faster rate than any other energy-usingsector over the past decade. For this, efficient fuel consumption modes of transport, and switching to low-carbon fuels are the requirement of time.

In a nutshell, we must develop a two-pronged approach: firstly, we must reduce emissions and stabilise the levels of greenhouse gasses in our atmosphere; secondly, we must adapt climate-friendly lifestyles and pursue the principles of sustainable economic growth.

Although Pakistan is facing environmental challenges, which include climate change impacts, loss of biological diversity, deforestation and degradation of air and water quality, Pakistan is trying to respond well. Because of the deteriorating economy, the country could not do much. But still, the present government has launched the Ten Billion Trees Tsunami Programme to lead the country towards aiming at revival of forestry and control air, weather, wildlife, forestation, watershed management and soil conservation to combat the negative impacts of climate change. Pakistan is amongst the pioneers who have established a climate ministry. The country has also launched the Climate Change Policy 2012. The National Climate Change Policy comprehensively addresses all possible challenges of climate change and provides a foundational framework to tackle the problem. But Pakistan alone cannot do it. It is a global issue. The whole of the world’s future is at stake.

It is time that the United Nations, along with all 195 countries, do not let the grass grow under its feet and act now to save the mother earth.

The writer is an advocate of the High Court and teaches law

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Pakistan’s Climate Challenges Pose a National Security Emergency

A whole-of-government approach is needed now before climate change exacerbates conflict in the country.

By: Jumaina Siddiqui

Publication Type: Analysis

Pakistan is in the midst of a terrible heatwave , with the temperatures in parts of the country exceeding 120 F. April was the hottest month in the past 61 years, until May came along and saw warmer temperatures. At least 65 people have reportedly died due to the heatwave, but the actual numbers are certainly higher, and it’s caused massive flooding and infrastructure damage in Gilgit-Baltistan, water shortages in Karachi and broader Sindh province, and placed greater demands on the country’s weak electrical grid. Despite monsoon rains beginning in late June — causing at least 77 deaths — many parts of the country still swelter. Pakistan should treat these climate disasters as a full-fledged national security emergency before they stoke conflict that adds further stress amid the country’s other numerous challenges.

Climate Challenges Could Stoke Conflict

For the past 20 years, Pakistan has consistently ranked among the top 10 most vulnerable countries on the Climate Risk Index, with 10,000 fatalities due to climate-related disasters and financial losses amounting to about $4 billion from 173 extreme weather events. These challenges threaten to spark climate-related conflict over resources — such as water — that have become scarce due to climate change impacts. Climate-related disasters like floods, heatwaves or tsunamis can also exacerbate tensions among groups who already have a history of conflict. Any of these scenarios would be a serious threat to Pakistan and have serious ramifications for any government in the immediate aftermath of a climate disaster or as part of efforts to mitigate future disasters.

This year’s heatwave further exacerbated food insecurity, which can undermine peace and stability, according to the United Nations. Scorching temperatures have damaged entire orchards and hurt wheat production across Pakistan, adversely impacting the livelihoods of many small farmers and rendering formerly arable land unusable for agriculture in some parts of the country. Already facing wheat shortages due to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Pakistan’s domestic wheat production this year will be reduced by 10% .

During Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit to the United States to attend a United Nations meeting on food security, he highlighted that the country is under threat of food, water and energy insecurity. Unfortunately, it is not just a threat anymore but a reality for Pakistan. Combined with soaring inflation and the country’s continued political instability, this is a recipe for disaster. All these trends are potential catalysts that could trigger climate-induced migration from rural areas to urban centers as Pakistanis seek employment and stable living conditions. This puts an additional strain on massive cities and urban infrastructure that already cannot manage their current population levels.

A Mixed Response

Pakistan’s Supreme Court has also taken notice of Pakistan’s climate change vulnerabilities. In a recent decision, the court noted that that in urban areas in particular, relevant government authorities should take into consideration “adaptation, climate resiliency and sustainability…[as] they are essential to actualize the fundamental rights of the people.”

While some subnational government agencies have been more effective in preparing for climate-related disasters, other have not. In Gilgit Baltistan, the heatwave caused a massive glacial flood, but thanks to continuous monitoring by the relevant local government authorities, people living in vulnerable locations were relocated to safer places before the floods. After the 2020 floods in Karachi, the provincial government decided to address the causes that lead to the severe flooding after the waters subsided. However, their heavy-handed actions — such as tearing down settlements along the nalas, or waterways, that should have drained the flood waters without considering proper plans to resettle or adequately compensate those displaced from the settlements — led to a number of protests from both communities and civil society activists.

It took this heatwave for the Sindh government to notice and take action against the water mafias controlling the city, even though this has been a problem for a decade or more. The water issue connects to the larger issue of natural resource usage and extraction throughout Pakistan, in particular the availability of water, whether it is for agricultural purposes or for consumption. The current heatwave has created an acute water crisis in Sindh, leading to inter-provincial tensions with Punjab — and it’s unclear if there is a resolution in sight .

Pakistan has tried to play a significant role on the international stage, participating in COP26 and signing the global methane pledge. The country is one of the world’s major methane emitters , predominately through its agricultural sector. How this commitment will impact this sector more broadly remains to be seen, especially as Pakistan seeks international financing to meet this commitment. While climate-smart agricultural practices generally save money in the long run, it is important to understand how these changes would impact large-scale farmers and their workers, the latter of whom are one of the most economically disadvantaged groups in country. 

The previous Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government had a strong advocate in Malik Amin Aslam, who served as the special advisor to the prime minster on climate change. The PTI government made significant strides in their efforts to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change such as committing to having 60% of energy coming from “clean” sources and to having electric vehicles making up 30% of the market by 2030.

The current coalition government, led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), has smartly continued the trend of strong leadership on climate change by appointing Senator Sherry Rehman , a member of the Pakistan Peoples Party, as minster for climate change. While leadership on this issue is imperative, it is equally important that there is a tangible and sustained collaboration and coordination between the national and provincial governments to develop a roadmap to address the impacts of climate change on the country. Because of devolution in Pakistan, issues like water, food and agriculture, and environment are ones where the provinces have the authority to pass governing legislation, while climate change is a federal issue. This disconnect must be resolved through a more robust system for interprovincial coordination. 

What Pakistan Needs

The PML-N government’s announcement to set up a climate change task force in response to the heatwave is a step in the right direction. But if Pakistan is serious about tackling climate change and investing in mitigation and adaption efforts, what is needed is an overarching framework to coordinate this response. One recent model to look to is Pakistan’s National Command and Operation Center (NCOC), which led the country’s COVID-19 response. A climate-focused NCOC would ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to address the impacts of climate change on the country and appropriate coordination takes place that builds political consensus. This would require relevant provincial and national bodies to come together to work develop a common action plan to address the internal impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the NCOC would spearhead the implementation  of Pakistan’s National Determined Contributions under the Paris Accords because some of these efforts would need provincial buy-in.   

It is unclear if Pakistan’s new climate change task force will carry the same weight as the COVID-19 NCOC. But if it is to succeed, then learning from the successes and failures of the NCOC model is imperative. The COVID-19 NCOC took a whole-of-government approach to tackle the crisis head on. In the beginning there was significant tension between the federal and provincial governments on measures such as the timing and scope of lockdowns and whether provinces had the legal mandate to dictate how businesses functioned during the pandemic. However, in the interest of combatting the pandemic, a delicate understanding between and cooperation among political parties in power in different provinces did eventually occur. 

National and provincial governments are working in lockstep right when it comes to energy conservation. But this cooperation will need to be sustained over the long haul. Unlike COVID-19 where we have vaccines and other mitigation tools, climate change is a significantly more complex challenge that will require long-term coordination and commitment. Almost PKR 10 billion (approximately $50 million) has been allocated to the Ministry of Climate Change under the 2022-23 national budget, a decrease from the PKR 14 billion in the 2021-22 national budget. This change is likely due to the economic situation in the country, but still shows a commitment to the issue and continuity between governments as the PTI government’s signature “10 Billion Tree Tsunami” project received an earmark. 

Alongside these domestic efforts, both the United States and Pakistan should hold a second meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Climate and Environment Working Group, following the first meeting held in September 2021. This working group could serve as the springboard to begin repairing and resetting the tenuous U.S.-Pakistan relationship as addressing climate change and promoting regional stability is in the interest of both nations.   

All mainstream political parties agree that climate change is threat to Pakistan’s social and economic stability. Addressing climate change in Pakistan truly requires a “ war-footing ” and a whole-of-government approach. Otherwise, the consequences of inaction or improper action could foster greater turmoil and strife for all levels of Pakistani society. 

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The challenge of climate change and policy response in Pakistan

• Original Article
• Published: 24 February 2016
• Volume 75 , article number  412 , ( 2016 )

Cite this article

• Mohammad Aslam Khan 1 ,
• Jawed Ali Khan 2 ,
• Zulfiqar Ali 1 ,
• Imran Ahmad 3 &
• Muhammad Nauman Ahmad 4  

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Climate change is expected to have adverse impact on Pakistan. This is ironical for a country, which ranks 135th in the world in terms of global green house gases (GHG) emissions per capita, but ranks 16th in terms of vulnerability to climate change. Climate change poses a major threat to all dimensions of sustainable development and has widespread impacts across various sectors and ecosystems such as food, water and energy; forests and biodiversity; coastal and marine environment; as well as on the occurrence and intensity of climate related hazards such as floods and drought. It also carries potential for internal and external conflicts. The paper examines the present and potential impact of climate change in Pakistan, and reviews national policies and plans to examine the extent to which climate-related issues have been integrated within these. The paper also discusses adaptation and mitigation measures and identifies the key elements that need to be included in the Climate Change Action Plan of Pakistan and stresses their mainstreaming into the national development policies and plans.

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Mohammad Aslam Khan & Zulfiqar Ali

Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

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Khan, M.A., Khan, J.A., Ali, Z. et al. The challenge of climate change and policy response in Pakistan. Environ Earth Sci 75 , 412 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-015-5127-7

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• Published: 13 August 2024

Reducing climate change impacts from the global food system through diet shifts

• Yanxian Li   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1947-7541 1 ,
• Pan He   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1088-6290 2 , 3 ,
• Yuli Shan   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5215-8657 4 ,
• Ye Hang   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1368-905X 4 ,
• Shuai Shao   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9525-6310 6 ,
• Franco Ruzzenenti 1 &
• Klaus Hubacek   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2561-6090 1  

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How much and what we eat and where it is produced can create huge differences in GHG emissions. On the basis of detailed household-expenditure data, we evaluate the unequal distribution of dietary emissions from 140 food products in 139 countries or areas and further model changes in emissions of global diet shifts. Within countries, consumer groups with higher expenditures generally cause more dietary emissions due to higher red meat and dairy intake. Such inequality is more pronounced in low-income countries. The present global annual dietary emissions would fall by 17% with the worldwide adoption of the EAT-Lancet planetary health diet, primarily attributed to shifts from red meat to legumes and nuts as principal protein sources. More than half (56.9%) of the global population, which is presently overconsuming, would save 32.4% of global emissions through diet shifts, offsetting the 15.4% increase in global emissions from presently underconsuming populations moving towards healthier diets.

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The ongoing nutrition transition thwarts long-term targets for food security, public health and environmental protection

Adoption of the ‘planetary health diet’ has different impacts on countries’ greenhouse gas emissions

Food choices impact both our health and the environment 1 , 2 . The food system is responsible for about one-third of global anthropogenic GHG emissions 3 , 4 and climate goals become unattainable without efforts to reduce food-related emissions 5 , 6 . However, not everyone contributes the same way to food-related emissions because of disparities in lifestyle, food preferences and affordability within and across countries 7 , 8 , 9 . High levels of food consumption (especially animal-based diets), one of the leading causes of obesity and non-communicable diseases 10 , 11 , lead to substantial emissions 9 , 12 . Simultaneously, >800 million people still suffer from hunger and almost 3.1 billion people cannot afford a healthy diet 13 . Ending hunger and malnutrition while feeding the growing population by extending food production will further exacerbate climate change 14 , 15 . Given the notable increase in emissions driven by food consumption despite efficiency gains 16 , changing consumer lifestyles and choices are needed to mitigate climate change 17 .

Research shows that widespread shifts towards healthier diets, aligned with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the United Nations 18 , offer solutions to this complex problem by eradicating hunger (SDG 2), ensuring health (SDG 3) and mitigating emissions (SDG 13) 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 . Numerous dietary options have been proposed as guidelines for diet shifts 1 , 23 , 24 . The planetary health diet 12 , proposed by the EAT-Lancet Commission, stands out as a prominent option. It aims to improve health while limiting the impacts of the food system within planetary boundaries by providing reference intake levels for different food categories 9 , 25 . It is flexibly compatible with diversities and preferences of regional and local diets 12 . Previous research has estimated changes in country-specific environmental impacts, including GHG emissions 26 , 27 , 28 and water consumption 25 , resulting from adopting the planetary health diet. However, there is limited evidence on how different population groups will contribute differently in this process 7 .

Food consumption and associated emissions differ as a result of disparities in consumer choices guided by social and cultural preferences, wealth and income 29 . Quantifying food-related emissions along the entire supply chain for different products and population groups provides information for emission mitigation through changing consumer choices 17 . With the improved availability of household consumption data, recent studies have revealed inequality in energy consumption 30 , 31 and carbon emissions 17 , 32 , 33 , 34 . Although there are several studies on income- or expenditure-specific food-related emissions within individual countries based on survey-based data 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , previous studies have not assessed global food-related emissions with a detailed breakdown into specific products and population groups. Furthermore, reducing the overconsumption of wealthy or otherwise overconsuming groups can increase the availability of resources for reducing hunger and malnutrition 7 . However, it remains unclear how emissions from different population groups would change in response to global diet shifts.

To fill these gaps, this study evaluates GHG emissions (CO 2 , CH 4 and N 2 O) throughout the global food supply chains (including agricultural land use and land-use change, agricultural production and beyond-farm processes) 16 induced by diets, termed ‘dietary emissions’, in 2019 and the potential emission changes of global diet shifts. Food loss and waste during household consumption 25 , 39 , 40 have been subtracted from the national food supply to obtain dietary intake. We quantify dietary emissions of 140 products 16 (classified into 13 food categories 12 ) on the basis of the global consumption-based emissions inventory of detailed food products 16 . By linking detailed food intake amounts to the food consumption patterns of 201 global expenditure groups (grouped according to the per capita total expenditure of each group) from the household-expenditure dataset 41 based on the World Bank Global Consumption Database (WBGCD) 42 , we analyse the unequal distribution of dietary emissions in 139 countries or areas, covering 95% of the global population. Despite limitations, the total expenditure of consumers, which effectively reflects patterns in household income, consumption and asset accumulation, is a useful approximation to represent levels of income and wealth 31 , 43 . Additionally, we build a scenario of shifting from diets in 2019 to the global planetary health diet to estimate emission changes ( Methods ). This study investigates differences in dietary emissions among regions, countries and population groups, identifying areas where efforts are needed to mitigate emissions during the global transition towards a healthier and more planet-friendly diet.

Present dietary emissions across countries

In this study, dietary emissions account for emissions along the entire global food production supply chains, which are allocated to final consumers of diets. We use the term ‘GHG footprints’ to specifically refer to the dietary emissions of an individual over 1 year 17 , 34 . The total dietary emissions and country-average per capita GHG footprints show different distributions across countries in 2019 (Fig. 1a ; for detailed food categories see Supplementary Figs. 1 – 9 ). The present total global dietary emissions reach 11.4 GtCO 2 e (95% confidence interval 8.2–14.7 Gt) (details of uncertainty ranges in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 ). China (contributing 13.5% of emissions) and India (8.9%), the world’s most populous countries (Supplementary Table 3 ), are the largest contributors to global dietary emissions. Alongside Indonesia, Brazil, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Russia, Japan and Mexico, the top ten contributors represent 57.3% of global dietary emissions but with very unequal per capita emissions within and between countries. We find the highest country-average per capita footprints in Bolivia, with 6.1 tCO 2 e, followed by Luxembourg, Slovakia, Mongolia, the Netherlands and Namibia, with >5.0 tCO 2 e (Supplementary Discussion 2.1 ). Haiti (0.36 tCO 2 e) and Yemen (0.38 tCO 2 e) have the lowest country-average footprints, followed by Burundi, Ghana and Togo. Insufficient food intake of residents due to limited food affordability 44 , 45 is the root cause of low footprints in these low- and lower-middle-income countries 46 .

a , Total and per capita dietary emissions for 139 countries/areas. b , Regional dietary emissions from different food categories and populations. The bar chart (left primary axis) shows the regional emission amounts and the line chart (right secondary axis) shows the number of regional populations. Columns are ordered by the descending per capita GDP of regions (Supplementary Tables 5 and 6 ). USA, United States; AUS, Australia; WE, Western Europe; CAN, Canada; JPN, Japan; RUS, Russia; ROEA, Rest of East Asia; EE, East Europe; CHN, China; ROO, Rest of Oceania; NENA, Near East and North Africa; BRA, Brazil; ROLAC, Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean; ROSEA, Rest of Southeast Asia; IDN, Indonesia; IND, India; ROSA, Rest of South Asia; and SSA, Sub-Saharan Africa. Details for the division and scope of regions are shown in Supplementary Fig. 10 and Supplementary Tables 7 and 8 . Country classification by income levels is based on the World Bank 46 . Credit: World Countries basemap, Esri ( https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/esri::world-countries/about ).

Source data

While animal-based (52%) and plant-based (48%) products contribute nearly equally to global dietary emissions 4 , 16 , the latter accounts for 87% of calories in global diets (Supplementary Table 4 ). The three main sources of emissions, namely red meat (beef, lamb and pork) (5% of calories), grains (51%) and dairy products (5%), contribute to 29%, 21% and 19% of global emissions, respectively. The substantial emissions from red meat and dairy products are attributed to their considerably higher emissions per unit of calories compared to other categories (Supplementary Table 4 ).

To highlight emission differences at a regional level, we further group the country-level results into 18 regions according to geographical locations and development levels (Fig. 1b and Supplementary Fig. 10 ). In most regions, animal-based products contribute fewer calories (less than a quarter) (Supplementary Data 21 ) but yield more emissions than plant-based products, especially in Australia (84% from animal-based products), the United States (71%) and the region Rest of East Asia (71%) where residents excessively consume both red meat and dairy products. However, the consumption of plant-based products in Indonesia (83% of total calories), Rest of Southeast Asia (92%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (77%) accounts for the most emissions, at 92%, 73% and 64%, respectively. Southeast Asia including Indonesia has a high-emission proportion from grains (42%) due to the prevalent meals dominated by rice. The typical food basket in Sub-Saharan Africa is broadly made up of grains, tubers, legumes and nuts 25 , 47 , representing over half of the regional emissions.

Unequal distribution of dietary emissions within countries

We find substantial differences in per capita GHG footprints within countries and regions. To clearly present the distribution of footprints within each country and region, individuals are sorted in ascending order of their total expenditure levels and then sequentially allocated to ten expenditure deciles with equal population size (Supplementary Fig. 11 and Fig. 2a ). As expenditures increase, individuals tend to have higher levels of footprints, with the largest increase attributed to red meat and dairy products. Richer populations usually have higher per capita footprints related to animal-based products than the poorer in most regions (Fig. 2b ). However, there are differences in per capita footprints within expenditure deciles. For example, even in high-income countries such as Australia and Japan, the dietary intake of red meat for some people in the poorest deciles falls below the recommended levels (Supplementary Data 15 ). Rest of East Asia is one exception, with the poorest decile having high footprints due to a substantial intake of red meat, as seen in Mongolia where beef and mutton are the most common dish 48 .

a , GHG footprints from all types of food categories. The size of the bubble refers to the average total expenditure represented by the decile. b , GHG footprints from different food categories. The colours of bubbles in a and b indicate expenditure deciles ranging from the poorest in blue to the wealthiest in red and are comparable only within each region.

Footprints related to plant-based products in specific regions show a different trend from animal-based products as expenditures increase. The middle expenditure groups are responsible for the highest footprints associated with grains in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and the highest footprints of tubers, vegetables and fruits (mainly starchy tropical fruits 49 ) in the Rest of Oceania. These locally produced, high-carbohydrate products are traditional staple foods. In poor countries, agricultural policy primarily targets improving the productivity of staple food, with little investment in the market and facilities for nutrient-rich products 50 , 51 . Consequently, the need for dietary diversity for middle- and low-income people is not adequately addressed 50 , leading to increased consumption of these lower-cost products. However, wealthier consumers can afford more expensive products, such as red meat, reducing their reliance on these staple products.

We use the GHG footprint Gini (GF-Gini) coefficient, calculated on the basis of data from 201 expenditure groups, to measure the dietary emission inequality within a country (Fig. 3 ), with 0 indicating perfect equality and 1 indicating perfect inequality. The inequality of dietary emissions tends to decline with the increase of the per capita GDP of a country, especially for animal-based products. We find the highest inequality of dietary emissions of food products generally in low-income countries, most of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the highest spending 10% of the population contributes 40% of the regional emissions from red meat, 39% from poultry and 35% from dairy products. In contrast, high-income countries generally have relatively low inequality with high levels of emissions despite country-to-country variations. The GF-Gini coefficients for all types of products of most Western European countries are <0.20 (Supplementary Tables 9 and 10 ), which is lower than for other high-income countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan.

a – j , The x axis represents the country-average per capita GDP, and the y axis represents the national GF-Gini coefficients of all types of ( a ) and different ( b – j ) food categories. b , Beef, lamb and pork. c , Dairy products. d , Poultry, eggs and fish. e , Grains. f , Tubers and starchy vegetables. g , Vegetables and fruits. h , Legumes and nuts. i , Added fats. j , All sugars. Logarithmic regression (red solid line) and locally weighted regression analysis (blue dotted line) are used to determine the relationship between the national GF-Gini coefficient (dependent variable) and the country-average per capita GDP (independent variable). The coefficients of determination ( R 2 ) and the exact P values from the two-sided Student’s t -test for the logarithmic regression are indicated in each subgraph. The error bands (grey shaded areas) represent 95% confidence intervals around the fitted logarithmic regression lines. Blue, orange and green dots represent all types of products, animal-based products and plant-based products, respectively.

Dietary emission shares across consumer groups

There are notable differences in dietary emission shares associated with food categories across expenditure deciles between regions (Fig. 4 ). In high-income countries, expenditure groups have relatively similar patterns of dietary emissions, with large shares of red meat and dairy products contributing the largest amount of emissions. Even poor consumer groups in high-income countries tend to be more likely to be able to afford animal-based products as a result of relatively lower prices for dairy products, eggs, white meat and processed red meat. This contrasts with the high prices of animal-based products due to supply constraints in most low- and lower-middle-income countries 52 , 53 . Except in high-income countries, starchy staple foods (including grains and tubers), with low prices but high-carbohydrate content 44 , 54 , constitute a large proportion of dietary emissions because of the high level of consumption, especially in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. As individuals’ expenditures increase in these countries, emission shares from starchy staple foods in total emissions decrease substantially. These changes demonstrate that as the affordability of food increases, populations tend to adopt instead more diverse diets composed of fewer starchy staple foods and more meat, dairy products, vegetables and fruits. This trend generally aligns with Bennett’s Law 25 , 55 , 56 . For example, research shows that with rapid economic growth, China’s urban or high-income groups increase their intake of non-starchy foods to fulfil their requirements of dietary diversity 35 , while poorer groups, often engaging in strenuous physical jobs, predominantly consume inexpensive starchy staple foods. One exception is Rest of Oceania, where poorer groups have higher percentages of emissions from not only tubers but also vegetables and fruits. Owing to relatively low expenditure on food, poor populations in this island region usually choose locally cultivated tubers and fruits (such as cassava, taro and bananas) 57 , 58 with high intensities of land-use emissions 59 .

The numbers at the bottom of each bar represent the expenditure levels of regional expenditure deciles, ranging from the poorest (1) to the wealthiest (10). Food categories are shown in the colour legend. a , United States. b , Australia. c , Western Europe. d , Canada. e , Japan. f , Russia. g , Rest of East Asia. h , Eastern Europe. i , China. j , Rest of Oceania. k , NENA. l , Brazil. m , ROLAC. n , Rest of Southeast Asia. o , Indonesia. p , India. q , Rest of South Asia. r , Sub-Saharan Africa.

Emission changes from adopting the planetary health diet

To estimate the emission changes from a global diet shift, we build a hypothetical scenario by assuming that everyone in all countries adopts the planetary health diet ( Methods ). Results indicate that the global dietary emissions would decrease by 17% (1.94 (1.51–2.39) GtCO 2 e) compared with the 2019 level (details of the uncertainty ranges can be found in Supplementary Tables 11 and 12 ). The presently overconsuming groups (56.9% of the global population) would save 32.4% of global emissions through diet shifts, more than offsetting the 15.4% increase in global emissions from the presently underconsuming groups (43.1% of the global population) as a result of adopting healthier diets (Supplementary Table 13 ). National dietary emissions in 100 countries would decline by 2.88 GtCO 2 e, whereas the other 39 countries (mainly low- and lower-middle-income countries 46 in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) would have an increase in emissions by 938 MtCO 2 e (Fig. 5a ; for detailed food categories see Supplementary Figs. 12 – 20 ).

a , Volume changes and percentage changes of national emissions for 139 countries/areas. b , Regional emission changes from different food categories. Abbreviations of 18 regions and the source of the base map are listed in Fig. 1 caption.

Countries would be affected differently regarding emission changes by adopting the planetary health diet, reflected in the percentage change in national emissions (Fig. 5a ). Uzbekistan (−74%), Australia (−70%), Qatar (−67%), Turkey (−65%) and Tajikistan (−64%) would see the largest percentage decrease. In comparison, most of the countries with an estimated considerable percentage increase are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, with the largest percentage increase from Iraq (+155%). Notably, with the increase in per capita GDP, the percentage change in overall dietary emissions of countries shows a shift from a positive to a negative trend, primarily led by changes in animal-based emissions (Supplementary Fig. 21 ).

Global emission reduction would be dominantly driven by red meat and grains (Fig. 5b ). The reduction in meat, eggs and fish would lead to 2.04 GtCO 2 e of emission reduction, of which 94% is driven by the decrease in red meat. China (22%), the United States (15%) and Brazil (14%) would be the largest contributors to emission reduction associated with a decrease in red meat consumption. A decline in grains would result in 914 MtCO 2 e of emission reduction, of which 56% would happen in Asia. A further 240 and 89 MtCO 2 e reduction in emissions would come from reduced sugars and tubers, respectively. However, increased proteins (legumes and nuts and dairy products), added fats and vegetables and fruits would partly offset the above-reduced emissions by 41%. Intake of legumes and nuts would increase in all regions, leading to a further 757 MtCO 2 e of emissions, whereas most of the emission increase related to added fats (largely vegetable oils) (279 Mt) and dairy products (143 Mt) would take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, China and other Asian countries. Global dietary emissions associated with vegetables and fruits would increase by 163 Mt, despite declines in China and Rest of Oceania.

The decline in per capita GHG footprints would be achieved primarily in wealthy consumer groups in high- and upper-middle-income countries, while increased footprints would occur mainly in poor groups in most countries (Fig. 6a ). Results show that the shifts of chief protein sources from animal-based to plant-based proteins according to the planetary health diet 12 would contribute the most to changes in footprints globally (Fig. 6b ). For example, in Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States where diets are dominated by red meat and dairy products, the top and upper-middle expenditure groups would have notable reductions in footprints. However, most populations in South and Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa would have a considerable increase in footprints because of the present low levels of red meat intake. Meanwhile, the present intake of plant-based proteins in all countries is below the recommended level 25 . Footprints related to legumes and nuts would increase for most expenditure groups in all regions to meet nutrient demands. This increase is particularly substantial in Rest of Oceania, Brazil, Indonesia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the consumed legumes and nuts are domestically produced with high land-use emission intensities 59 , 60 , assuming the present production and trade patterns remain unchanged.

a , Changes in GHG footprints from all types of food categories. The size of the bubble refers to the average total expenditure represented by the decile. b , Changes in GHG footprints from different food categories. The colours of bubbles in a and b indicate expenditure deciles ranging from the poorest in blue to the wealthiest in red and are comparable only within each region.

Discussion and conclusions

This study uncovers the extent of inequality of dietary emissions within countries based on detailed expenditure data 17 , 34 and underlines the dependence of dietary emissions on expenditure and income levels. Emissions aggregated at expenditure deciles may lose some fine-grained information from the 201 expenditure groups. For example, people from the lowest expenditure groups in affluent countries may experience malnutrition or even hunger, which is not adequately captured at a decile level. Nevertheless, the GF-Gini coefficient calculated from 201 groups provides an accurate reflection of emission inequality. Results show that affluent countries consume high-emission diets but show relatively lower levels of inequality, whereas many poor countries tend to have diets with lower emissions but higher levels of inequality.

The objective of the diet shift scenario is to assess the potential implications of emission mitigation of the food system resulting from changing consumer choices. Widespread diet shifts offer dual benefits by moving 43.1% of the global population out of underconsumption and mitigating 17% of global dietary emissions. The simulated changes in the volume of global emissions under the planetary health diet approximate the findings by ref. 26 (Supplementary Discussion 1 ). However, worldwide diet shifts require tailored policies targeted at regions, countries, expenditure groups and products instead of ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies.

We find that, compared to plant-based products, animal-based products, particularly red meat and dairy products, exhibit greater potential for reducing both emission volumes and emission disparities among different expenditure groups. Priorities lie in reducing the overconsumption of specific emission-intensive products in affluent countries (particularly the high-expenditure groups), such as beef in Australia and the United States, to achieve health 9 , 12 and climate benefits 25 , 26 , 28 . Incentives, such as implementing subsidies or taxation on environmental externalities through food or carbon pricing 61 , ecolabelling 62 and expanding the availability of less emission-intensive products (for instance, menu design for diverse vegetarian foods 63 ), can encourage consumers to make dietary changes. Moreover, a well-designed (primarily urban) food environment can reshape residents’ dietary patterns 35 and the parallel development of urban planning and infrastructure can alleviate the time and financial burdens of shifts to healthier diets 64 . However, in countries such as Mongolia, where diets heavily rely on red meat and dairy products because of their traditional nomadic lifestyle and limited accessibility of diverse foods, especially in rural areas 48 , diet shifts may not be feasible but there is a need to improve national nutritional education 48 .

Low-income countries face more severe challenges in reaching healthier diets. On the one hand, diet shifts require increased food consumption in these countries. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the planetary health diet requires a 3.4-fold increase in dairy consumption for the entire population and a 69-fold increase for the poorest decile (Supplementary Fig. 22 ). However, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia, which have experienced stagnating agriculture production efficiency for decades 8 , cannot produce domestically nor afford to import the food required for diet shifts 65 . It is crucial to enhance the production efficiency of feed and food crops through various measures such as crop and soil management techniques 8 , 66 and the introduction of high-yielding crop varieties and hybrids 67 , 68 . Moreover, increasing the proportions of nutrient-rich products in food imports 65 and reducing restrictive trade policies which tend to raise food prices 25 , 69 help to address this challenge. On the other hand, poor populations often opt for lower-cost, calorie-dense but less nutritionally beneficial foods. High cost and low affordability remain the largest barriers for these individuals to select healthier diets 44 , 54 , 70 , 71 . Others 44 found that >1.58 billion low-income populations worldwide cannot afford the cost of the planetary health diet. Therefore, policy efforts (for instance, pricing interventions 72 , technical assistance to reduce food production costs 73 and so on) should focus on making food more affordable and accessible, especially for lower expenditure groups 37 , 74 . However, studies indicate that lower food prices may decrease the income of agricultural households 75 , 76 , widen wealth gaps between individuals employed in food- and non-food sectors, especially in low-income agrarian countries and exacerbate rural poverty 1 , 77 . In this sense, policies aimed at promoting diet shifts should be deliberately and cautiously designed with vulnerable groups in mind to reduce inequality 37 , 61 .

Lastly, altered food demand due to diet shifts can induce notable structural adjustments within the global agri-food system. Although this study does not assess the feasibility of countries supplying sufficient food if the planetary health diet was adopted, results indicate that the composition of global food production would change considerably to adapt to the substantial changes in demand 8 , 25 , 77 . The diet shifts would necessitate the global supply (in calorie content) of red meat decrease by 81%, all sugars by 72%, tubers by 76% and grains by 50%, while that of legumes and nuts increase by 438%, added fats by 62% and vegetables and fruits by 28% (Supplementary Data 16 ). Research 77 , 78 confirms that changed food demand could cause fluctuating prices of agricultural products and land in global markets, triggering spillover effects between different food categories or to other non-food sectors (for example, stimulating biofuel production) and partly offsetting the benefits of diet shifts. Therefore, policy-making should focus on alleviating these effects. Incentives such as increased subsidies or tax breaks can generate new economic opportunities and motivations for industries that need to scale up production to meet the heightened demand for products (for example, plant-based proteins). By contrast, for emission-intensive food industries that need to downsize, measures such as gradual crop substitution 25 , 79 could be adopted to optimize production and reduce the costs of production transformations while safeguarding the interests of producers.

In this study, we first assess the GHG emissions from diets comprising 140 products 16 (Supplementary Table 14 ) in 139 countries or areas (we collectively use the term ‘country’ because most of them are individual countries) (Supplementary Data 1 ) in 2019 based on the global consumption-based emission inventory of detailed food products from ref. 16 . The inventory 16 provides data (in mass units) of GHG emissions (including CO 2 , CH 4 and N 2 O) generated during supply chain processes, including agricultural land use and land-use change (LULUC), agricultural activities and beyond-farm processes (excluding emissions from household and end of life) 4 . All emissions are allocated to final consumers of food products. The year 2019 (the latest year before the COVID-19 pandemic) is selected as a baseline year, which can reflect the level of present dietary intake without the interference of the pandemic 80 , 81 . Subsequently, dietary emissions from different expenditure groups are quantified by matching diets with the household-expenditure dataset 42 to reflect the differences and potential inequality of dietary emissions. Finally, to measure the magnitude of the emission impact of the global diet shift, we model the transition from diets in 2019 to the widespread adoption of the planetary health diet. The research framework of this study is shown in Supplementary Fig. 23 .

The following data sources are mainly used in this study. The consumption-based food emissions inventory 16 is based on data derived from the FAOSTAT 82 , comprising national emission accounts of supply chain processes and data on food trade and production. Data on food loss and waste throughout the global supply chain and at the household level as well as food supply data, all used for linking emissions with diets, are obtained from FAOSTAT 83 and previous research 25 , 39 . The household-expenditure data 41 are built on the basis of the WBGCD 42 and further refined and supplemented by consumer expenditure surveys from high-income countries 17 , 41 to bridge the dietary emissions with different expenditure groups. Detailed data sources used for calculation are provided in Supplementary Table 15 . Data processing, assumptions and uncertainties for all calculations are also given.

Dietary energy intake and emissions

Accounting of food consumption and supply chain emissions.

The estimation of the present dietary emissions and the emission changes for adopting the EAT-Lancet planetary health diet 12 is based on the accounting framework designed by ref. 16 . They assess global GHG emissions induced by the consumption of food products in 181 countries based on the physical trade flow approach 84 , 85 . Consumption-based GHG emissions along global supply chains, including local production and international trade, are calculated as follows 16 , 84 :

where E i,r refers to the consumption-based GHG emission of product i in country r . G i / P i represents the vector of direct emission intensity of product i from entire food supply chain processes, of which G i denotes total emissions generated from entire supply chain process of product i , P i is the production vector of product i . \({(I-{A}^{i})}^{-1}\) is the trade structure of product i , of which A i is the matrix of export shares and I is the identity matrix with the same dimension as matrix A i . DMI i refers to the vector of direct material input of product i and DMC i,r is the vector of domestic material consumption of product i in country r with values set to zero for other countries. The DMI of a country is defined as the total inputs of products and the DMC is defined as the amount of products consumed domestically. DMI equals DMC plus exports of products (or production plus imports). F i refers to the vector of total (or consumption-based) emission intensity of product i from food supply chain processes, that is, total emissions induced by per unit of domestic consumption of product i . All variables in equation ( 1 ) are in units of mass (metric tonnes).

Feed products are excluded from diets because emissions from feed crops have been allocated to livestock products that consume feed during production 16 . Food loss and waste (FLW) along supply chains and households are subtracted to quantify the net intake amount of food products from the household stage.

Dietary calorie conversions

We use the annual per capita food supply (FS) quantity of 140 food products from the supply utilization accounts of FAOSTAT 83 and population from the United Nations 86 to calculate the total supply amount of product i in country r (FS i,r , in the unit of mass):

where \({{\rm{FS}}}_{{\rm{per}}}^{i}\) denotes the per capita supply of product i per year and p r refers to the population in country r .

To be consistently matched with the DMC , the FS values should be limited within the coverage of the DMC and values that exceed this range are removed. At the same time, to aggregate food products into food categories and compare their nutritional contents with the reference level from the planetary health diet, we convert the quantity of food consumption or supply into calorie content using product-specific nutritive factors (calories per unit weight of product) 87 , 88 from FAO (Supplementary Table 14 ).

Subtracting food loss and waste at the household level

The food supply derived from FAOSTAT datasets does not exclude FLW that happens during household consumption 25 . FLW before dietary intake can be divided into two parts: the FLW during supply chain processes (including agricultural production, postharvest handling and storage, processing and packaging and distribution) as well as the FLW during the food preparation and supply for household consumption 39 , 40 . The food supply value provided by FAOSTAT only excludes FLW during supply chain processes. Therefore, we exclude household FLW using the method by ref. 25 to calculate the annual dietary intake for each product as follows:

where DI i,r and \({{\rm{DI}}}_{{\rm{per}}}^{i,r}\) refer to the national and per capita caloric intake amount of product i in country r each year, respectively. \({{\rm{FS}}}_{{\rm{energy}}}^{i,r}\) and \({{\rm{FS}}}_{{\rm{energy}\_per}}^{i,r}\) are the national and per capita supply quantity (in calorie content) of product i annually, respectively. Parameter \({f}_{{\rm{FLW}}}^{\;i,r}\) is the FLW factor in the household consumption stage 39 of food product i in country r . Others 39 provide regional FLW factors, expressed as the weight percentage of food that is lost or wasted at different stages of food production and consumption, for different food categories. As a result, household food waste is subtracted from the FS to obtain the dietary intake amount of each product. Detailed household FLW factors are shown in Supplementary Table 16 .

Quantifying dietary GHG emissions

Our equation ( 1 ) can be transformed into the following equation to calculate the total emission intensity of food calorie consumption:

where \({F}_{{\rm{energy}}}^{\,i,r}\) represents total emissions per unit of calorie content of product i in country r , \({{\rm{DMC}}}_{{\rm{energy}}}^{i,r}\) refers to total calorie content of product i consumed domestically in country r . Then, emissions from the dietary intake (without FLW) of product i in country r ( \({E}_{{\rm{intake}}}^{\,i,r}\) ) are calculated as follows:

Classification of food categories

The EAT-Lancet Commission report provides coverage of different food categories in the planetary health diet and their recommended caloric intake levels at 2,500 kcal for adults each day 12 (Supplementary Table 17 ). In this study, we classify 140 products into 13 aggregated food categories according to the planetary health diet 12 , including grains, tubers or starchy vegetables, vegetables, fruits, dairy products, red meat (beef, lamb and pork), chicken and other poultry, eggs, fish, legumes, nuts, added fats (both unsaturated and saturated oils) and all sugars. On the basis of the data availability of the FAOSTAT 4 , 82 , the food products in this study include both primary and processed products (primary and secondary food processing) which can be classified into specific food categories 16 . Ultraprocessed products that combine ingredients from several food categories, such as ice creams made from both dairy and sugar, are not considered. Detailed coverages of each food category and their mapping relationship with specific products are shown in Supplementary Table 18 .

Matching diets with the household-expenditure dataset

We explore the dietary emissions from consumers with different expenditure levels (defined as expenditure groups) using the household-expenditure dataset 41 for the year 2011. The dataset, containing 116 countries and almost 90% of the global population (Supplementary Table 19 ), is primarily based on the household survey microdata from the WBGCD 42 , supplemented by consumer expenditure surveys of national statistical offices from high-income countries such as the United States and European countries 17 , 41 . For every country in the dataset, 201 expenditure groups (grouped according to the per capita total expenditure of each group) and the corresponding population share are listed. The annual per capita expenditure of people in different expenditure groups ranges from <US$50 to ~US$1 million per year (expressed in 2011 Purchasing Power Parities, PPP) 31 , 34 . For each expenditure group, the expenditure for 33 different sectors of goods and services (including 11 food items) and the corresponding expenditure share in national consumption of each sector are provided 31 , 34 , 41 . For some affluent (or poor) countries that do not have a sufficient representative number of people at the bottom (or top) end of the expenditure spectrum, the population in the corresponding expenditure groups is empty. Expenditure shares of 11 food items are matched with the 140 products in this study (Supplementary Table 20 ). We calculate the dietary intake of different food products for each expenditure group in each country by multiplying the food expenditure share of groups with the total dietary intake amounts of food products of each country.

This study assumes that the amount of food consumption is proportionate to food expenditures and the purchasing price for the same product is unchanged across 201 groups ignoring higher prices for high-quality or luxury food items within the same food category. Although the assumption of an unchanged purchasing price is an unsolved limitation shared by similar studies using monetary expenditure data 31 , 34 , 41 , household expenditures on food can still effectively highlight the differences in food consumption and emissions across consumer groups with different affordability of, and spending on, food. We also assume that the proportion of food sources from local production and trade for the same food category remains constant across the 201 groups. In other words, the magnitude of dietary emissions is solely determined by the size and pattern of food expenditure of each group and the associated supply chains for each food consumption item.

For countries that are major food consumers (and emitters) but without data in WBGCD, expenditure shares from countries with similar development levels and eating habits and neighbouring geographical locations are used to calculate the distribution of their food expenditure. We finally select 201 expenditure groups in 139 countries/areas, covering 95% of the global population in 2019 (Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Data 3 ). Details for dealing with missing data are provided in Supplementary Table 7 . Countries or areas are then classified into 18 regions for comparison according to geographical locations (Supplementary Table 8 ). The WBGCD expenditure data from the year 2011 are adjusted to PPP in 2019 to represent the expenditure level of populations in figures. Results of emissions from 13 types of food categories of 201 expenditure groups at the national and regional levels are shown in Supplementary Data 8 , 10 and 11 .

Analysis of GF-Gini coefficients

Calculation of gf-gini coefficients.

This study uses the GF-Gini coefficient 33 , 89 , which is based on the well-known Gini coefficient 90 , to measure the inequality of GHG footprints from 201 expenditure groups within countries, regions and globally. The GF-Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, indicating the emission distribution across expenditure groups changes from perfect equality to perfect inequality. The GF-Gini coefficient of each food category is calculated as 33 :

where Gini j indicate the GF-Gini coefficient of food category j (including product i , i  = 1, 2, 3, …, n ). Expenditure groups and their population are reordered in ascending order of per capita GHG footprint of food category j and m refers to the reordered number of groups ( m  = 1, 2, 3, …, 201). \({D}_{m}^{j}\) and \({Y}_{m}^{j}\) represent the proportions of population and GHG footprints (of food category j ) for each expenditure group, respectively. \({T}_{m}^{j}\) is the cumulative proportion of GHG footprints of each expenditure group. The results of national, regional and global GF-Gini coefficients are shown in Supplementary Tables 9 and 10 .

Regression analysis

We use the regression approach to examine the relationship between the national GF-Gini coefficients and the per capita GDP 91 , 92 of 139 countries/areas. The GF-Gini coefficient of each country is regarded as the dependent variable ( y ) and the national per capita GDP acts as the independent variable ( x ). Initially, locally weighted regression is applied to illustrate the trend lines within the scatterplot. Subsequently, we test different regression methods for validation based on the general trend. Ultimately, we found that logarithmic regression is the most fitting for dietary emissions of most food categories, particularly in the case of animal-based products. Thus, the logarithmic regression is applied.

Scenario of the planetary health diet

Scenario setting and assumptions.

To estimate the emission changes resulting from the transition from the 2019 diet to the global planetary health diet, we build a hypothetical scenario by assuming that individuals belonging to 201 different expenditure groups in all countries will all reach the reference intake level of 13 types of food categories 12 . First, we assume that the proportion of food sources from local production and trade in each country is unchanged, that is, emission changes from dietary shifts would be calculated on the basis of emissions from local production and imports accounting for emissions along global food supply chains, similar to studies by refs. 25 , 26 . At the same time, emission changes induced by decreased food consumption in countries following the planetary health diet, such as carbon uptake from agriculture abandonment 59 or emission increase from non-food biomass production in saved agricultural land 77 , are not considered in this study. Second, we assume that agricultural and food-related production technology, trade patterns and emission intensities of food supply chain processes remain unchanged during the diet transition. Third, fluctuations in food prices induced by altered food demand or the affordability of the planetary health diet for different consumer groups are not considered in this study.

Diet gaps for different food categories

The diet gap (DG) reflects gaps between present dietary intake and the planetary health diet 12 , 25 , as follows:

where \({{\rm{DG}}}_{{\rm{per}}}^{j,r}\) is defined as the percentage ratio of the present per capita caloric intake of food category j in country r each year ( \({{\rm{DI}}}_{{\rm{per}}}^{\,j,r}\) ) to the annual reference level ( \({{\rm{DI}}}_{{\rm{EAT}}\_{\rm{per}}}^{i}\) ). \({{\rm{DI}}}_{{\rm{EAT}\_day\_per}}^{\,j}\) is the recommended per capita caloric intake of food category j each day 12 (Supplementary Table 17 ). We assume a uniform annual calorie reference level for each food category across all populations in all countries. We allow flexibility in local diets by keeping the composition of each food category unchanged, requiring only that the calorie content reaches the reference level. According to the definition, present food intake is considered insufficient compared with reference levels when DG is <100%, while it is deemed excessive and should be reduced when DG is >100%. Daily per capita caloric intake of food categories from 201 expenditure groups of countries or regions are shown in Supplementary Data 12 and 13 . We calculate the DG for food categories of 201 expenditure groups at national and regional levels (Supplementary Data 14 and 15 ).

According to equation ( 1 ), the total emissions per unit of calorie content of food category j in country r ( \({F}_{{\rm{energy}}}^{\;j,r}\) ) can be calculated as:

where E j,r refers to the national emissions due to consumption of food category j in country r . Thus, emission changes for adopting the planetary health diet are calculated as follows:

where \(\Delta {E}_{{\rm{intake}}}^{\;j,r}\) represents the national emission changes of food category j in country r , \({E}_{{\rm{intake}}}^{\;j,r}\) is the national emissions from intake of food category j in country r . Changes in dietary emissions of food categories from 201 groups are shown in Supplementary Data 9 . The number of people with increased/decreased emissions from 201 groups is shown in Supplementary Data 19 .

Uncertainty analysis

We assess the uncertainty range of dietary emissions from different food products using a Monte Carlo approach, which simulates the uncertainties caused by activity data, emission factors and parameters in each emission process 16 , 59 , 93 . More details can be found in Supplementary Methods 1 .

Limitations

This study has the following limitations regarding data analysis and scenario setting.

In terms of data analysis, this study is limited by the data availability. First, we use regional household food loss and waste factors of aggregated food categories without more detailed product division at the national level because of a lack of data. There might also be differences between calculated and actual food intake amounts that are unable to be removed, such as animal bones or fruit skins 25 . Second, we use the consumer household-expenditure dataset based on WBGCD for the year 2011, which provides the most precise and detailed differentiation of consumer groups and their consumption patterns within countries so far. We assume that the shares in food expenditure and population for each expenditure group are the same as in 2011. Third, we assume that the composition of different products aggregated in one category consumed by expenditure groups is the same as the national consumption composition and there is no difference in the price of food products purchased by people from different expenditure groups. In addition, data for some populous high- or upper-middle-income countries are missing from the household-expenditure dataset. However, the countries are the world’s major food consumers and emitters, their emission changes due to diet shifts are important for the global food system. We use the expenditure shares of similar countries in the household-expenditure dataset to allocate the distributions of food expenditure in these countries.

In terms of scenario setting, we focus on the impact induced by changes in consumer choices without changing the proportion of food supply sources (domestic production and imports). We do not consider altering the proportions of supply sources and associated emissions in this study. However, future studies may explore the impacts of the production side and supply chains for diet shifts. Moreover, as we focus on the present emission inequality and mitigation potentials within the food system, we assume that the income and expenditure levels of expenditure groups remain unchanged. However, a shift in food supply may affect household income and subsequently alter the household food budgets, especially for populations employed in, or countries reliant on, food-related sectors. Additionally, as a result of data and model limitations, this study does not consider price fluctuations induced by food demand and subsequent changes in household affordability or spillover effects (between food categories or to non-food sectors). Future studies may combine assessment models incorporating elasticities to project the long-term feasibilities and consequences of diet shifts.

Reporting summary

Further information on research design is available in the Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

Data for LULUC, agricultural and beyond-farm emissions and data for physical food consumption are curated by the FAO and can be freely obtained from FAOSTAT 82 , available from ref. 16 . Data of food loss and waste rate are retrieved from FAOSTAT 82 and ref. 25 . The global household-expenditure data are obtained from the World Bank 42 and refs. 17 , 41 . Population data used in this study are obtained from World Population Prospects of the United Nations 86 . Data on per capita GDP in countries can be collected from the World Bank 91 and the International Monetary Fund 92 . Supplementary datasets are also available on Zenodo ( https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11934909 ) 94 . Source data are provided with this paper.

Code availability

Data collection is performed in MATLAB and Microsoft Excel. Code developed for data processing in MATLAB and R in this study is available from Zenodo ( https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11880402 ) 95 .

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Acknowledgements

This study was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant nos 72243004, 32101315, 71904098). Y.S. and S.S. acknowledge support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant no. 72243004). Yu Li acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant no. 32101315). P.H. acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China under a Young Scholar Programme Grant (grant no. 71904098). Yanxian Li and Y.H. acknowledge the funding support by the China Scholarship Council PhD programme. We thank Y. Zhou for supporting visualization and J. Yan for assisting in writing and revising. For the purpose of open access, a CC BY public copyright license is applied to any author accepted manuscript arising from this submission.

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Yanxian Li, Franco Ruzzenenti & Klaus Hubacek

School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

Department of Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

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Yanxian Li, Y.S. and K.H. designed the research. Yanxian Li performed the analysis with support from P.H., Yu Li, Y.H. and S.S. on analytical approaches and visualization. Yanxian Li led the writing with efforts from P.H., Y.S., F.R. and K.H. Y.S. and K.H. supervised and coordinated the overall research. All co-authors reviewed and commented on the manuscript.

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Li, Y., He, P., Shan, Y. et al. Reducing climate change impacts from the global food system through diet shifts. Nat. Clim. Chang. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02084-1

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Pakistan is facing a severe climate change crisis, with far-reaching consequences for its environment, economy, and human population. The country is ranked seventh among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, and its impacts are already being felt across various sectors.

Rising Temperatures and Extreme Weather Events

Pakistan has witnessed a significant increase in temperatures over the past few decades, with an average rise of 0.5°C since 1960. This warming trend is projected to continue, with temperatures expected to rise by another 2-3°C by 2050. The consequences of this warming are widespread, from heatwaves to droughts, and from floods to landslides.

Melting Glaciers and Water Scarcity

Pakistan's glaciers are melting at an alarming rate, threatening the country's water security. The glaciers in the Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Himalayan (HKH) region, which supply water to the Indus River, are projected to lose up to 65% of their mass by 2050. This will lead to reduced water flows, affecting agriculture, industry, and human consumption.

Deforestation and Land Degradation

Deforestation and land degradation are significant contributors to climate change in Pakistan. The country has lost over 30% of its forest cover in the past few decades, leading to soil erosion, landslides, and reduced biodiversity.

Agricultural Impacts

Climate change is affecting agriculture in Pakistan, with changing weather patterns, reduced water availability, and increased frequency of extreme weather events. This has led to reduced crop yields, affecting food security and the livelihoods of farmers.

Health Impacts

Climate change is also having significant health impacts in Pakistan, from heat stress to water-borne diseases. The country is already experiencing increased mortality rates due to heatwaves, and the situation is expected to worsen in the coming years.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts of climate change in Pakistan are significant, with estimated losses ranging from 2-5% of GDP annually. The country's infrastructure, industry, and agriculture are all vulnerable to climate-related disasters, affecting economic growth and development.

The climate change crisis in Pakistan requires urgent attention and action. The country needs to adopt a multi-faceted approach to address the causes and impacts of climate change, from reducing greenhouse gas emissions to promoting climate-resilient agriculture practices. Additionally, disaster risk reduction and management strategies need to be put in place to mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events. Only through collective action can Pakistan hope to mitigate the worst impacts of climate change and build a sustainable future.

It is a long established fact that a reader will be distracted by the readable content of a page when looking at its layout.

• Pakistan's Climate Crisis: A Ticking Time Bomb
• The climate change crises in Pakistan
• Climate change crisis in Pakistan
• How Climate Change Causes Social and Economic Problems in Pakistan
• How Climate Change Causes Social and Economic Problems in Pakistan: Insights from Alkhidmat Foundation

Climate change: a real threat to Pakistan

There are some efforts in addressing climate change at the global and national levels

The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) published a 3675-page report earlier this week which should not be ignored due to the hypes surrounding the Ukraine war and a no-trust vote against PM Imran Khan. The report titled ‘Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ found that the scientific evidence has become stronger that all life on earth, including human civilisation, is vulnerable to a changing climate. But how?

Food production: There is new knowledge that climate change is affecting food webs. Changes in temperature, rainfall, and extreme weather have increased the frequency and affected agriculture production and patterns. The report referred to the flood damages to crops in Pakistan in 2010 which cost $4.5 billion. It is also estimated that 8-10% of today’s farmland will become climatically unsuitable by 2100. This is very relevant to Pakistan which imports food products regularly from overseas to feed 220 million people in the country.

Water: Climate change will impact water quality and availability causing vulnerabilities to both rural and urban areas. The rural areas will suffer from a drought affecting food production and the livelihood of rural communities. On the other hand, the urban population suffer from water scarcity and heatwaves. The report found that the average mortality from floods, storms and droughts is 9 times higher in Pakistan and other highly vulnerable countries as compared to European countries. This is particularly alarming as various part of the country is suffering from water availability.

Coastal cities: People living in cities face higher risks of heat stress, reduced air quality, lack of water, and food shortages caused by climate change. However, this risk is severe in coastal cities such as Karachi due to the risk from coastal-specific climate hazards. The recent urban flooding in Karachi shows that flood-related vulnerabilities will be spread over rich and poor areas of the city.

There are some efforts in addressing climate change at the global and national levels. However, these efforts are too late and too little. It is clear now that minor, marginal, reactive or incremental changes won’t be sufficient. We need urgent and more ambitious action and, at the same time, rapid and deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. The report found institutional and financial barriers that restrict cities from investing in new parks and green infrastructure to cool down during heatwaves.

What is the solution then? The IPCC report highlights a solutions framework called Climate Resilient Development or CRD.

CRD means cutting back greenhouse gas emissions and conserving biodiversity in energy, industry, health, water, food, urban development, housing and transport policies and practices, in fact everyday decision-making. Its means CRD cannot be achieved with a single action such as planting trees. In fact, it involves fundamental changes to how government and society function, including changes to underlying values, worldviews, ideologies, social structures, political and economic systems in the country. The report admits that the world has no single magic solution and each country has to devise its own path for CRD.

Looking at the climate change risk and vulnerability for Pakistan and the capacities of government, the whole nation should prioritise climate change understanding in their daily life. Therefore, adaptation to climate change for the government means transforming the policies we plan our cities, regions and infrastructure. Adaptation to climate change for society means reducing water usage, using healthy diets, asking for sustainable farming, using cycling and public transport and finding green and clean solutions for our houses.

We have to remember the scientific evidence is clear — climate change is a threat to human well-being and the health of the planet. Any further delay in concerted action at national, provincial and local levels will miss a rapidly closing window to secure a liveable future.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 3 rd , 2022.

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INTRODUCTION Global Climate-Change Impact Studies Centre is a dedicated research institute for climate change studies in Pakistan. The Centre is mandated for national level R&D effort, capacity building, policy analysis, information dissemination and assistance to national planners and policymakers on issues related to past and projected future climatic changes in the country, their likely impacts on the key socio-economic sectors of the country such as water, food, agriculture, energy, forestry, health, and ecology, and appropriate adaptation and mitigation measures. RESEARCH AREAS PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS IMPACTS, ADAPTATION & VULNERABILITY MITIGATION & CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 4 April, 2024 The GCISC extends a warm welcome to the Honorable Ms. Romina Khurshid in her new role as the coordinator to the Prime Minister on Climate Change and Environmental Coordination. We are enthusiastic about your dedication to addressing climate change challenges and eagerly anticipate working with your kind support. 24 March, 2024 Mr. Aizaz A. Dar's appointment as Secretary of the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination is welcomed by the Centre. He will also serve as Vice-Chair of the Board of Governors of GCISC. It is hoped that under his dynamic leadership, GCISC will flourish and continue to provide science-based insights for policymaking and climate action. GCISC and GIZ jointly organize a workshop to launch National and Provincial Climate Risk Profiles and CLimate Information Resource (CIR) Portal under SAR Project at Ramada Hotel on March 20, 2024. © 2020 GCISC Copyrights reserved www.sifc.gov.pk Knowledge is power Stay in the know about climate impacts and solutions. Subscribe to our newsletters. Eye on the Storm News Weekly News from Yale Climate Connections Stay in the know about climate impacts and solutions. Subscribe to our weekly newsletter. By clicking submit, you agree to share your email address with the site owner and Mailchimp to receive emails from the site owner. Use the unsubscribe link in those emails to opt out at any time. Yale Climate Connections When will climate change turn life in the U.S. upside down? Share this: Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Click to share on X (Opens in new window) The words of explorer John Wesley Powell on the eve of his departure into the unexplored depths of the Grand Canyon in 1869 best describe how I see our path ahead as we brave the unknown rapids of climate change: We are now ready to start our way down the Great Unknown. We have an unknown distance yet to run, an unknown river to explore. What falls there are, we know not; what rocks beset the channel, we know not; what walls rise over the river, we know not. Ah, well! We may conjecture many things. The men talk as cheerfully as ever; jests are bandied about freely this morning; but to me the cheer is somber and the jests are ghastly. Powell’s expedition made it through the canyon, but the explorers endured great hardship, suffering near-drownings, the destruction of two of their four boats, and the loss of much of their supplies. In the end, only six of the nine men survived. Likewise, we find ourselves in an ever-deepening chasm of climate change impacts, forced to run a perilous course through dangerous rapids of unknown ferocity. Our path will be fraught with great peril, and there will be tremendous suffering, great loss of life, and the destruction of much that is precious. It is inevitable that climate change will stop being a hazy future concern and will someday turn everyday life upside down. Very hard times are coming. At the risk of causing counterproductive climate anxiety and doomism, I offer here some observations and speculations on how the planetary crisis may play out, using my 45 years of experience as a meteorologist, including four years of flying with the Hurricane Hunters and 20 years blogging about extreme weather and climate change. The scenarios that I depict as the most likely are much harsher than what other experts might choose, but I’ve seen repeatedly that uncertainty is not our friend when it comes to climate change. This will be a long and intense ride, but if you stick through the end, I promise there will be a rainbow. By late this century, I am optimistic that we will have successfully ridden the rapids of the climate crisis, emerging into a new era of non-polluting energy with a stabilizing climate. There are too many talented and dedicated people who understand the problem and are working hard on solutions for us to fail. Jump to a section of this essay What is a dangerous level of climate change, climate change’s impacts will be highly asymmetric, an immediate u.s. climate change threat: an insurance crisis, a second potential immediate u.s. climate change threat: a global food shock, “black swan” and “gray swan” extreme weather events, a “new normal” of extreme weather has not yet arrived, longer-range concerns: global catastrophic risk events, devastating impacts from climate change are accelerating, paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology, hope for the future via ‘cathedral thinking’. Although there is a major climate change hurricane approaching, we’re busy throwing a hurricane party , charging up our planetary credit card to pay for the expenses, with little regard to the approaching storm that is already cutting off our escape routes. This great storm will fundamentally rip at the fabric of society, creating chaos and a crisis likely to last for many decades. The intensifying climate change storm will soon reach a threshold I think of as a category 1 hurricane for humanity — when long-term global warming surpasses 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperatures, a value increasingly characterized over the last decade as “dangerous” climate change . For humanity as a whole, this amount of warming is risky, but not devastating. Global warming is currently at about 1.2-1.3 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperatures and is likely to cross the 1.5-degree threshold in the late 2020s or early 2030s . Assuming that we don’t work exceptionally hard to reduce emissions in the next 10 years, the world is expected to reach 2 degrees Celsius of warming between 2045 and 2051. In my estimation, that will be akin to a major category 3 hurricane for humanity — devastating, but not catastrophic. Allowing global warming to exceed 2.5 degrees Celsius will cause category 4-level damage to civilization — approaching the catastrophic level. And warming in excess of 3 degrees Celsius will likely be a catastrophic category 5-level superstorm of destruction that will crash civilization. We must take strong action rapidly to rein in our emissions of heat-trapping gases to avoid that outcome — and build great resilience to the extreme climate of the 21st century that we have so foolishly brought upon ourselves. According to the Carbon Action Tracker (see tweet below), we are on track for 2.7 degrees Celsius of warming; if the nations of the world meet their targets for reducing heat-trapping climate pollution, warming will be limited to 2.1 degrees. There’s a big difference between being hit by a Cat 4 versus a Cat 3, and every tenth of a degree of warming that we prevent will be critical. Two years on from Glasgow and our warming estimates for government action have barely moved. Governments appear oblivious to the extreme events of the past year, somehow thinking treading water will deal with the flood of impacts? https://t.co/fbM4xY9OJe pic.twitter.com/MekGIeU1Z3 — ClimateActionTracker (@climateactiontr) December 5, 2023 As climate scientist Michael Mann explains in his latest book, “ Our Fragile Moment ,” great climate science communicator Stephen Schneider once said, “The ‘end of the world’ or ‘good for you’ are the two least likely among the spectrum of potential [climate] outcomes.” So forget sci-fi depictions of planetary apocalypse. That will not be our long-term climate change fate. But the impacts of climate change will be apocalyptic for many nations and people — particularly those that are not rich and White. People and communities with the least resources tend to be the first and hardest hit by climate change , not only because poorer people and communities are inherently more vulnerable to the impacts of any disaster, but also because the extremes induced by climate change tend to be worse in the tropics and subtropics, home to many poor nations. In the U.S., climate change has already turned life upside down for numerous communities. For example, in North Carolina, the financially strapped, Black-majority towns of Fair Bluff and Princeville are in danger of abandonment from hurricane-related flooding (from Hurricane Floyd in 1999, Matthew in 2016, and Florence in 2018). Seven Springs, North Carolina (population 207 in 1960, now just 55) is largely abandoned. Climate change was a key contributor to these floods; a 2021 study found that about one-third of the cost of major U.S. flood events since 1988, totaling $79 billion, could be attributed to climate change. And for the town of Paradise, California — utterly destroyed by the devastating Camp Fire of 2018, which killed 85 and caused over $16 billion in damage — climate change has been apocalyptic. In the U.S., the most likely major economic disruption from climate change over the next few years might well be a collapse of the housing market in flood-prone and wildfire-prone states. Billion-dollar weather disasters — which cause about 76% of all weather-related damages — have steadily increased in number and expense in recent years and would be even worse were it not for improved weather forecasts and better building codes. The recent increase in weather-disaster losses has brought on an insurance crisis — especially in Florida , Louisiana , California , and Texas — which threatens one of the bedrocks of the U.S. economy, the housing and real estate market. In California, the insurer of last resort, the FAIR plan, had only about $250 million in cash on hand as of March 2024. “One major fire near Lake Arrowhead, where the Plan holds $8 billion in policies, would plunge the whole scheme into insolvency,” observed Harvard’s Susan Crawford, author of “Charleston: Race, Water, and the Coming Storm.” It is widely acknowledged that higher weather disaster losses result primarily from an increase in exposure : more people with more stuff moving into vulnerable places, including those at risk of floods. Martin Bertogg, Swiss Re’s head of catastrophic peril, said in a 2022 AP interview that two-thirds, perhaps more, of the recent rise in weather-related disaster losses is the result of more people and things in harm’s way. But this balance will likely shift in the coming decades. Increased exposure will continue to drive increased weather disaster losses, but the fractional contribution of climate change to disaster losses — at least for wildfire, hurricane, and flood disasters — is likely to increase rapidly, making the insurance crisis accelerate. A 2023 study (Fig. 2) drew attention to a massive real estate bubble in the U.S.: the vast number of properties whose purported value doesn’t account for the true costs of floods. The study estimated that across the U.S., residential properties are overvalued by a total of $121-$237 billion under current flood risks. This bubble will likely continue to grow as sea levels rise, storms dump heavier rains, and unwise risky development continues. Likewise, U.S. properties at risk of wildfires are collectively overvalued by about $317 billion, according to David Burt , a financial guru who foresaw the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Insurers are already pulling out of the areas most at risk, threatening to make property ownership too expensive for millions and posing a serious threat to the economically critical real estate industry. Climate futurist Alex Steffen has described the climate change-worsened real estate bubble this way: As awareness of risk grows, the financial value of risky places drops. Where meeting that risk is more expensive than decision-makers think a place is worth, it simply won’t be defended. It will be unofficially abandoned. That will then create more problems. Bonds for big projects, loans, and mortgages, business investment, insurance, talented workers — all will grow more scarce. Then, value will crash, a phenomenon I call the Brittleness Bubble . Something brittle is prone to a sudden, catastrophic failure and cannot easily be repaired once broken. The popping of the real estate Brittleness Bubble will potentially trigger panic selling and a housing market collapse like a miniature version of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 but focused on the 20% of American homes in wildfire and flood risk zones. In his 2023 Congressional testimony , Burt estimated that a wildfire and flood-induced repricing of risk of the U.S. housing market could have a quarter to half the impact of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. However, the 2008 crisis was relatively short-lived, as fixes to the financial system and a massive federal bailout led to a rebound in property values after a few years. A climate change-induced housing crisis will likely be resistant to a similar fix because the underlying cause will worsen: Sea levels will continue to rise, flooding heavy rains will intensify, and wildfires will grow more severe, increasing risk. Science writer Eugene Linden wrote in 2023, “as we saw in 2008, a housing crisis can quickly morph into a systemic financial crisis because banks own most of the value, and thus the risk, in housing and commercial real estate.” Crawford of Harvard recently wrote : “Because insurance can help communities and households recover more quickly from disasters, and because so much of the U.S. economy is driven by spending on housing, the inaccessibility and unaffordability of insurance poses a threat to the stability of the entire economy.” As Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse , a Democrat from Rhode Island, said earlier this year, “The thing about economic crises is that they come on slowly, until they come on fast.” How the insurance crisis may play out: the “Wholly irrational and completely ad-hoc pirate capitalism” solution In his blunt 2023 essay, “ Insurance Politics at the End of the World ,” journalist Hamilton Nolan offers these thoughts on the potential ways this climate change-induced insurance crisis could be addressed: The rational capitalism solution here is: We accurately price your risk and that risk becomes unaffordable and people move away from areas that are stupid to live in and therefore climate adaptation is achieved. The rational socialism solution is: We collectively embrace the idea that we need to adapt to climate change and the federal government creates long-term programs that incentivize moving away from areas that are stupid to live in and disincentivize “build as much crap in South Florida flood zones as you can now to take advantage of the real estate bubble” and generally cushion the economic blow for all the people whose lives will have to change. The path we are on today, though — the path that our current political system makes likely — is the path of Wholly Irrational and Completely Ad-Hoc Pirate Capitalism: Increasing climate change-induced disasters cause panic among homeowners as a class; politicians rush to grab dollars to enable everyone to live the same as they are now for as long as possible; and eventually the whole thing crashes into the wall of reality in a way that causes uncontainable, national pain rather than just the specific, regional, temporary pain of the smarter solutions. When will the Brittleness Bubble pop? When might this “crash into the wall of reality” happen and the Brittleness Bubble pop? Politicians are working extremely hard to keep their jobs by delaying this day of reckoning, artificially limiting insurance rate rises and offering state-run insurance plans of last resort. This approach — the equivalent of giving a blood transfusion to the injured, without stopping the bleeding — does not fix the underlying problem and all but guarantees that the pain of the eventual national reckoning will be much larger. Insurance is designed to transfer risk, but risk is rising everywhere. As the hurricane season is set to begin soon and wildfire risk gradually increasing, private insurers in some states are fleeing areas considered at high risk. It's leaving so-called "residual," or last resort plans, to pick up the tab. https://t.co/3sxv9m0FOS pic.twitter.com/YTkZ9OlJE3 — Axios (@axios) May 10, 2024 Crawford addressed the issue in a 2024 essay, “ Who ends up holding the bag when risky real estate markets collapse? ” Citing financial guru Burt, she concluded: “2025 or 2026 is when things give way and it becomes very difficult to offload houses and buildings in risky places where mortgages are suddenly hard to get, much less insurance.” When asked in an interview with Marketplace if the market is due for another correction, as homeowners in places with growing risk of flooding and wildfire have to pay more for insurance, Burt said: This is actually happening right now and is probably going to happen over the next three to five years, like a full reckoning of these new costs for 15 or 20% of the homes in the U.S. … If all their equity is already gone [because of lowered property values], their costs are going up a ton, they can barely afford it, that’s when people walk away. In the same Marketplace story, though, Ben Keys, a professor of real estate and finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, said, “The idea that we would expect there to be a huge wave of defaults or delinquencies feels relatively unlikely.” But like Burt, climate change futurist Steffen predicts the real estate Brittleness Bubble will pop within five years (10 at the most). I suspect we're less than 5 years away from a prolonged surge of value loss in real estate assets based on risk, insurability, economic brittleness and local capacities to ruggedize (or not). That kind of devaluation will echo through the whole economy. https://t.co/Qs0zyMS38g — Alex Steffen (@AlexSteffen) May 21, 2024 This reckoning could come sooner for Florida if another $100-billion hurricane hits. The Florida insurance and coastal property market did manage to withstand the $117-billion cost of Category 4 Hurricane Ian of 2022, but another blow like that might well cause a severe downward spiral in the Florida real estate market from which it might never fully recover. This vulnerability was underscored by Florida Gov. DeSantis during a 2023 radio interview with a Boston host, when DeSantis suggested homeowners should “ knock on wood ” and hope the state didn’t get hit by a hurricane in 2024. But “knocking on wood” is not an effective climate adaptation strategy for Florida. Because of climate change, Mother Nature is now able to whip heavier bowling balls with more devastating impact down Hurricane Alley. It’s only a matter of time before she hurls a strike into a major Florida city, causing an intensified coastal real estate and insurance crisis. And the odds of such a strike are higher than average in 2024 because of record-warm ocean temperatures in the tropical Atlantic, combined with a developing La Niña event. Watch out for increased coastal flooding in the mid-2030s We may manage to avoid a coastal real estate market crash in the next 10 years if we get lucky with hurricanes and if our politicians continue to pump huge amounts of money to bail out the failing system. But it will become increasingly difficult to keep the coastal property market propped up beginning in the mid-2030s, because of accelerating sea level rise combined with an 18.6-year wobble in the moon’s orbit. Thus, I expect that the longest we might stave off the popping of the coastal real estate Brittleness Bubble is 15 years. As I wrote in my 2023 post, 30 great tools to determine your flood risk in the U.S. , beginning in 2033, the moon will be in a position favorable for bringing higher tides to locations where one high tide and low tide per day dominate. This will bring a rapid increase in high tide flooding to the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico, the Southeast, the West Coast, and Hawaii. This expected acceleration in the mid-2030s is obvious for St. Petersburg (Fig. 3), plotted using NASA’s Flooding Analysis Tool and Flooding Days Projection Tool . The rapid acceleration in coastal flooding simultaneously along a huge swathe of heavily developed U.S. coast in the mid-2030s will be sure to significantly stress the coastal housing market. And according to the Coastal Flood Resilience Project , the nation is flying blind on the possible impacts: There are no national assessments of the potential loss of major, critical infrastructure assets to coastal storms and rising seas. Another immediate danger: a series of global extreme weather events affecting agriculture, causing global economic turmoil. In my 2024 post, “ What are the odds that extreme weather will lead to a global food shock? ” I reviewed a 2023 report by insurance giant Lloyd’s, which modeled the odds of a globally disruptive extreme food shock event bringing simultaneous droughts in key global food-growing breadbaskets. The authors estimated that a “major” food shock scenario costing $3 trillion globally over a five-year period had a 2.3% chance of happening per year (Fig. 4). Over a 30-year period, those odds equate to about a 50% probability of occurrence — assuming the risks are not increasing each year, which, in fact, they are. Yet another concern for the U.S. is the risk of wholly unanticipated “black swan” extreme weather events that scientists didn’t see coming. As Harvard climate scientists Paul Epstein and James McCarthy wrote in a 2004 paper, “Assessing Climate Instability”: “We are already observing signs of instability within the climate system. There is no assurance that the rate of greenhouse gas buildup will not force the system to oscillate erratically and yield significant and punishing surprises.” One example of such a punishing surprise was Superstorm Sandy of 2012, that unholy hybrid spawn of a Caribbean hurricane/extratropical storm that became the largest hurricane ever observed and one of the most damaging, costing $88 billion. And who anticipated that a siege of climate-change-intensified wildfires in western North America beginning in 2017, causing multiple summers of horrific air quality that would significantly degrade the quality of life in the West? Or the jet stream experiencing a sudden increase in unusually extreme configurations over the past 20 years, leading to prolonged periods of intense extreme weather over multiple portions of the globe simultaneously? As the late climate scientist Wally Broecker once said, “Climate is an angry beast, and we are poking at it with sticks.” Just as concerning might be future “gray swan” events — extreme weather events that climate models anticipate could happen but exceed anything in the historical record. (“Gray swan” is an expression first coined by hurricane scientist Kerry Emanuel in his 2016 paper, “ Grey swan tropical cyclones .”) Several potential gray swan events I have written about include a $1 trillion California “ARkStorm” flood , the potential failure of the Old River Control Structure during an extreme flood that allows the Mississippi River to change course, or a storm like 2015’s Hurricane Patricia , with winds over 200 mph, hitting Miami, Galveston/Houston, Tampa, or New Orleans. The risk of gray swan events is steadily increasing. I’m often asked if the absurdly extreme weather events we’ve been experiencing recently are the new normal. “No!” I reply. “Heat is energy, so the energy to fuel more intense extreme weather events will increase until we reach net-zero emissions. At that time, the climate will finally stabilize at a new normal with a highly dangerous level of extreme weather events.” Barring a series of extraordinary volcanic eruptions or a major geoengineering effort, even under an optimistic “low” emissions climate scenario, the earliest the climate might stabilize is in the mid-2070s (Fig. 5); thus, the weather will grow more extreme, on average, for at least the next 50 years. Considering that CO2 emissions have not yet peaked and may be following the “Intermediate” pathway shown below, there is considerable danger that the weather will still be growing more extreme when today’s children are very old early next century. But even when net zero emissions are reached, sea level rise will continue to occur at a pace difficult to adapt to, and the climate crisis will continue to intensify. The high probability that the weather will grow more extreme throughout the lifetime of everybody reading this essay means that we have to take seriously some very bad long-term threats. As I wrote in my 2022 post, “ The future of global catastrophic risk events from climate change ,” a global catastrophic risk event is defined as a catastrophe global in impact that kills over 10 million people or causes over $10 trillion (2022 USD) in damage. Since the beginning of the 20th century, there have been only three such events: World War I, World War II, and the COVID-19 pandemic. But climate change is a threat multiplier, increasing the risk of five types of global catastrophic risk events: Coastal flooding from sea-level rise and land subsidence Collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), the powerful currents that circulate warm water in the tropical Atlantic Ocean to the Arctic and back (an August 2024 study gave a 59% chance of an AMOC collapse occurring before 2050) The likeliest of these is a global catastrophic risk event from sea level rise, which is highly likely to occur by the end of the century. For example, a moderate global warming scenario will put $7.9-12.7 trillion dollars of global coastal assets at risk of flooding from sea level rise by 2100, according to a 2020 study, “ Projections of global-scale extreme sea levels and resulting episodic coastal flooding over the 21st century .” Although this study did not take into account assets that inevitably will be protected by new coastal defenses, neither did it consider the indirect costs of sea level rise from increased storm surge damage, mass migration away from the coast, increased saltiness of fresh water supplies, and many other factors. A 2019 report by the Global Commission on Adaptation estimated that sea level rise will lead to damages of more than $1 trillion per year globally by 2050. Furthermore, sea level rise, combined with other stressors, might bring about megacity collapse — a frightening possibility when infrastructure destruction, salinification of freshwater resources, and a real estate collapse potentially combine to create a mass exodus of people from a major city, reducing its tax base to the point that it can no longer provide basic services. The collapse of even one megacity might have severe impacts on the global economy, creating increased chances of a cascade of global catastrophic risk events. One megacity potentially at risk of this fate is the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, with a population of 10 million. Land subsidence of up to two inches per year and sea level rise of about an eighth of an inch per year are causing so much flooding in Jakarta that Indonesia is constructing a new capital city in Borneo. Is the #AMOC approaching a tipping point? Here's my take after researching this topic for over 30 years. Open access, peer-reviewed, in full colour & understandable for non-experts. https://t.co/gMu6Zw5mR7 pic.twitter.com/mrgzO9NMxR — Prof. Stefan Rahmstorf 🌏 🦣 (@rahmstorf) April 11, 2024 I also expect one or more climate change-amplified global catastrophic risk events from drought will occur this century. Mexico City, with a metro area population of 22 million, has suffered record heat over the past year, is in danger of its reservoirs running dry, and is drilling ever-deeper wells to tap an overtaxed aquifer. Though the city will muddle through the crisis now that the summer rains have come this year, what is the plan for 30 years from now, when the climate is expected to be drier and much, much hotter? Although Mexico City can greatly improve its water situation by fixing a poorly maintained system that has a 40% loss rate , it is unclear how the city will be able to survive the much hotter and drier climate of 30 years from now. And at least 10 other major cities are in a similar bind. Technology can help us adapt to a hotter climate by providing air conditioning (if you are rich enough), but technological solutions to create more water availability when the taps run dry are much more difficult to achieve. I believe water shortages will drive a partial collapse of and mass migration out of multiple major cities 20-40 years from now, significantly amplifying global political and economic turmoil. For example, a 2010 study, “ Linkages among climate change, crop yields and Mexico-US cross-border migration ,” found that a 10% reduction in crop yields in Mexico leads to an additional 2% of the population emigrating to the United States. In his frightening 2019 book “ Food or War ,” science writer Julian Cribb documents 25 food conflicts that have led to famine, war, and the deaths of more than a million people — mostly caused by drought. Since 1960, Cribb says, 40-60% of armed conflicts have been linked to resource scarcity, and 80% of major armed conflicts occurred in vulnerable dry ecosystems. Hungry people are not peaceful people, Cribb argues. Though climate change itself is not accelerating faster than what climate scientists and climate models predicted , devastating impacts from climate change do seem to be accelerating. That is because the new climate is crossing thresholds beyond which an infrastructure designed for the 20th century can withstand. These breaches are occurring in tandem with an increase in exposure — more people with more stuff living in harm’s way — which is the dominant cause of the sharp increase in weather-disaster losses in recent years. It’s sobering to realize that the current U.S. insurance crisis has primarily been driven by increased exposure and foolish insurance policies that promote development in risky places — not climate change — and that climate change’s relative contribution to the crisis is set to grow significantly. Accelerating sea level rise alone is sure to cause a massive shock to the U.S. economy; according to a 2022 report from NOAA , sea level along the U.S. coastline is projected to rise, on average, 10-12 inches (0.25-0.30 meters) in the next 30 years (2020-2050), which will be as much as the rise measured over the last 100 years (1920-2020). At this level, 13.6 million homes might be at risk of flooding by 2051 , triggering a mass migration of millions of people away from the coast. If we add to sea-level-rise-induced migration the additional migration that will result from climate change-intensified wildfires, heatwaves, and hurricanes, we are forced to acknowledge the reality that a nation-challenging Hurricane Katrina-level climate change storm has already begun in the U.S., one which has the potential to cause catastrophic damage. As I wrote in my June post, The U.S. is finally making serious efforts to adapt to climate change , there have been some encouraging efforts to prepare for the coming mass migration. But, as I argued in my follow-up post, The U.S. is nowhere near ready for climate change , we remain woefully unprepared for what is coming. And my subsequent post, Can a colossal extreme weather event galvanize action on the climate crisis? , argues that we should not expect that any future extreme weather event or breakdown of the climate system will galvanize the type of response needed — we’ve already had at least 13 events since 1988 that should have done so, yet have not. Even if such an event did prompt strong, transformative change, it’s too late to avoid having life turned upside-down by climate change. It’s like we’ve waited until our skin started getting red before seeking shade from the sun, and we’re only now taking our first stumbling steps toward shade. Well, it’s a long hike to shade, and a blistering sunburn is unavoidable. Given the unprecedented nature and complexity of this planetary crisis, there is huge uncertainty on how this drama may unfold; there are climate scientists who offer a more optimistic outlook than I do (for example, Hannah Ritchie , author of “Not the End of the World”), and those who are more pessimistic ( James Hansen ). I suggest that you make the most of the current “calm before the storm” and prepare for the chaotic times ahead, which could begin at any time. I will offer my recommendations on how to do this in my next post in this series, “What should you do to prepare for the climate change storm?” The urgency to rapidly deal with the climate crisis was succinctly summarized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its latest summary report: “There is a rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a livable and sustainable future for all.” But taking advantage of that window of opportunity is difficult because of human psychological and political realities. In climate scientist Peter Gleick’s 2023 book, “The Three Ages of Water,” he quotes Harvard’s E.O. Wilson, father of sociobiology, who perhaps said it best: “The real problem of humanity is the following: We have Paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology. And it is terrifically dangerous, and it is now approaching a point of crisis overall.” The boat of civilization has already hit multiple rocks along the rapids of climate change and is taking on water. Perilous rapids with even more dangerous rocks and waterfalls lie before us, but the course of our boat cannot be so easily altered to avoid the rocks, because of our Paleolithic emotions and medieval institutions. As a result, we may have only a few more years — or perhaps as long as 15 years — of relative normalcy in our everyday lives here in the U.S. before the approaching climate change storm ends our golden age of prosperity. But this “golden age” was made of fool’s gold, paid for with wealth plundered from future generations. Though this essay has dwelt on some grim realities, I am optimistic that we will prevent climate change from becoming a civilization-destroying category 5-level catastrophe. But we must fight extremely hard to correct the course of our boat and not allow its inertia to carry us into the rocks that stud the rapids of climate change. This is not a task that can be accomplished in our lifetimes. Susan Joy Hassol, the climate communication veteran who served as a senior science writer on three National Climate Assessments, put it this way in an interview with Yale Climate Connections contributor Daisy Simmons: “This is the fight of our lives, and it’s a multigenerational task. We need what’s been called ‘cathedral thinking.’ That is, the people who started working on that stone foundation , they never saw the thing finished. It took generations to get these major works done. This is that kind of problem. And we have to all do our part. The more I act, the better I feel, because I know I’m part of the solution.” Actions we take now will yield enormous future benefits, and the faster we undertake transformative actions to adapt to the new climate reality, the less suffering will occur. The Global Commission on Adaptation says that “every $1 invested in adaptation could yield up to $10 in net economic benefits, depending on the activity.” We should work to build our cathedral of the future with the thought that each action we take now will multiply by a factor of 10 in importance in the future. An excellent @nytimes article on rapid growth of wind, solar, & EVs, including factories, in the US. Costs are below fossil and nuclear (see graphs). Reasons why, graphs with how fast, pictures of it happening. https://t.co/uglQDnE97t pic.twitter.com/oIpLmlp28v — Willett Kempton (@WillettKempton) September 5, 2023 But some of the hardest work has been done: The cornerstone of this cathedral of the future has already been laid. The clean energy revolution is here and has progressed far more rapidly than I had dared hope. Passage of the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and 2023 Inflation Reduction Act has been instrumental in getting this cornerstone laid. Solar energy is now the cheapest source of energy in world history, and the costs of wind power and battery technology have also plummeted. Two recent reports were optimistic that climate-warming carbon dioxide emissions had finally peaked in 2023, and GDP growth has decoupled from carbon dioxide emissions in recent years, giving hope that economic growth can still occur without making the planet hotter. At its heart, the root of the climate crisis is humanity’s spiritual inharmoniousness: We overvalue the pursuit of material wealth and we worship billionaires but undervalue growing more connected to our spiritual selves and acting to preserve and appreciate the natural systems that sustain us. Making yourself more peaceful and loving through quiet spiritual pursuits and time spent in nature will help counteract the anxiety and fear sparked by the climate crisis. But in tandem with your increased peace must come a righteous anger to “throw the money changers out of the temple” and topple the might of the fossil fuel industry and its enablers. So put your shoulder to an oar! Help us power the boat of civilization through the rapids of climate change. All of humanity shares the same boat, and you have the opportunity to make your own unique and valuable contribution to the effort. This is a nice way to visualize the pathway to your unique climate action. https://t.co/cjlv5XXrak — Jeff Masters (@DrJeffMasters) May 15, 2024 As promised, here is the rainbow at the end. It’s the intro image from my first and last Weather Underground blog posts, “ The 360-degree Rainbow ,” and “ So long, wunderground! ” My unique and valuable contribution to building our new cathedral has not yet reached the end of the rainbow, for a rainbow has no end — it is a full circle. One just has to fly high in a rainstorm where the sun is shining to see it. I will continue to make my voice heard as long as climate science-denying politicians, corporations, media pundits, and wealthy individuals continue to row the boat of civilization into the rocks of climate-change catastrophe. I encourage those of you who have learned about extreme weather and climate change from me to do the same. To get started, learn from one of the best communicators in the business, climate scientist Katherine Hayhoe : Recommended reading: What should you do to prepare for the climate change storm? Can a colossal extreme weather event galvanize action on the climate crisis? The U.S. is nowhere near ready for climate change The U.S. is finally making serious efforts to adapt to climate change Book review: “On the Move” is a must-read account of U.S. climate migration Book review: “The Great Displacement” is a must-read Part one of my three-part sea level rise series: How fast are the seas rising? Part two of my three-part sea level rise series: Eight excellent books on sea level rise risk for U.S. cities Part three of my three-part sea level rise series: 30 great tools to determine your flood risk in the U.S. Bubble trouble: Climate change is creating a huge and growing U.S. real estate bubble Many coastal residents willing to relocate in the face of sea level rise Disasterology: a book review The future of global catastrophic risk events from climate change With global warming of just 1.2°C, why has the weather gotten so extreme? Recklessness defined: breaking 6 of 9 planetary boundaries of safety Retreat From a Rising Sea: A book review Quick facts on climate change, extreme weather-related events, and their impacts on society Susan Crawford’s Substack feed on climate adaptation policy, Moving Day Climate futurist Alex Steffen’s newsletter Susan Joy Hassol ( @ClimateComms ) and Bob Henson ( @bhensonweather ) provided helpful edits for this post. We help millions of people understand climate change and what to do about it. Help us reach even more people like you. more like this The Pacific comes alive: Tropical cyclone threats to Hawai‘i and Japan Free online tool kit can help small businesses prepare for climate change How open spaces can save lives during wildfires Jeff masters. Jeff Masters, Ph.D., worked as a hurricane scientist with the NOAA Hurricane Hunters from 1986-1990. After a near-fatal flight into category 5 Hurricane Hugo, he left the Hurricane Hunters to pursue a... More by Jeff Masters Help & FAQ Impact of climate change on electricity demand: a case study of Pakistan Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review The energy sector is sensitive to changing weather patterns and Pakistan is one of those countries where temperature rise induced by climate change is expected to be above the world average. In this backdrop the present study aims at finding the impact of climate change on electricity demand in Pakistan at the regional and national level. Using monthly data on temperatures to find heating and cooling degree days, the relationship between monthly electricity demand and temperature is explored which is then used to find the impact of projected climate change on electricity demand. The results suggest surging peak loads in summer season due to climatic effect which calls for capacity instalments over and above that needed to cater to rise in electricity demand attributable to economic growth. Original language English Pages (from-to) 29-47 Number of pages 19 Journal Volume 55 Issue number 1 DOIs Publication status Published - 1 Mar 2016 Externally published Yes Climate change Degree days Electricity demand Access to Document 10.30541/v55i1pp.29-47 Licence: CC BY-NC-ND Other files and links Link to publication in Scopus T1 - Impact of climate change on electricity demand T2 - a case study of Pakistan AU - Mahmood, Rafat AU - Saleemi, Sundus AU - Amin, Sajid N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Pakistan Development Review. PY - 2016/3/1 Y1 - 2016/3/1 N2 - The energy sector is sensitive to changing weather patterns and Pakistan is one of those countries where temperature rise induced by climate change is expected to be above the world average. In this backdrop the present study aims at finding the impact of climate change on electricity demand in Pakistan at the regional and national level. Using monthly data on temperatures to find heating and cooling degree days, the relationship between monthly electricity demand and temperature is explored which is then used to find the impact of projected climate change on electricity demand. The results suggest surging peak loads in summer season due to climatic effect which calls for capacity instalments over and above that needed to cater to rise in electricity demand attributable to economic growth. AB - The energy sector is sensitive to changing weather patterns and Pakistan is one of those countries where temperature rise induced by climate change is expected to be above the world average. In this backdrop the present study aims at finding the impact of climate change on electricity demand in Pakistan at the regional and national level. Using monthly data on temperatures to find heating and cooling degree days, the relationship between monthly electricity demand and temperature is explored which is then used to find the impact of projected climate change on electricity demand. The results suggest surging peak loads in summer season due to climatic effect which calls for capacity instalments over and above that needed to cater to rise in electricity demand attributable to economic growth. KW - Climate change KW - Degree days KW - Electricity demand KW - Energy KW - Pakistan UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041679233&partnerID=8YFLogxK U2 - 10.30541/v55i1pp.29-47 DO - 10.30541/v55i1pp.29-47 M3 - Article AN - SCOPUS:85041679233 SN - 0030-9729 JO - Pakistan Development Review JF - Pakistan Development Review Climate Change in Nigeria: Impacts and Responses Department for international development, uk government. VoR (Version of Record) IDS Item Types Copyright holder, project identifier, additional licenses. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/ Usage metrics 102 IMAGES The Vulnerability of Pakistan's Water Sector to the Impacts of Climate CSS Essay outline Archives Climate Change Linked to Pakistan’s Floods, Study Finds Climate Change Profile of Pakistan Opinion Too Hot to Live In: Climate Change in Pakistan COMMENTS Pakistan Must Adapt to Climate Change. But Who Will Help Us? Ideas. By Sherry Rehman. August 15, 2023 4:00 AM EDT. Rehman is a politician, diplomat, author, and former Federal Minister of Climate Change of Pakistan. T he record-breaking mega-flood in August ... How Climate Change Causes Social and Economic Problems in Pakistan Addressing the social and economic problems caused by climate change requires a collective effort from individuals, communities, and organizations. Al Khidmat Foundation invites you to join us in our mission to support affected communities, promote sustainable development, and build resilience against the impacts of climate change. PDF PAKISTAN regional, and country data related to climate change and development. For the Asian Development Bank (ADB): its Strategy 2030 identified "tackling climate change, building climate and disaster resilience, and enhancing environmental sustainability" as one of its seven operational priorities. Its Climate Change Operational Addressing current climate issues in Pakistan: An opportunity for a Humanity faces an existential threat in the shape of climate change (Amster, 2014).Due to global warming, the weather patterns are changing continuously, leaving unprecedented impacts on the planet (Arfasa et al., 2024; Mora et al., 2013).The earth's average temperature has risen from 1.5 °C (Kjellström et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018).The environmentalists believe that if the phenomenon ... PDF CLIMATE CHANGE PROFILE OF PAKISTAN C. Sector Climate Change Impacts 23 1. Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry 23 2. Climate Change Impacts on Water Sector in Pakistan 28 3. Climate Change Impacts on Energy Sector 31 4. Climate Change Impacts on Coastal Areas 34 5. Climate Change Impacts on Transport and Urban Sector 35 6. Climate warming contributes to the record-shattering 2022 Pakistan On the other hand, studies reported that climate warming has enhanced Pakistan rainfall intensity by more than 50% 24,25,26,27, though the exact mechanisms remain unexplored and the impact of ... Climate change in rural Pakistan: evidence and experiences from a Pakistan is home to a wide range of geographical landscapes, each of which faces different climate change impacts and challenges. This article presents findings from a National Geographic Society funded project, which employed a people-centered, narratives-based approach to study climate impacts and adaptation strategies of people in 19 rural study sites in four provinces of Pakistan (N = 108 ... Turning Concern into Action: Understanding Climate Change Attitudes in Pakistan is grappling with the profound impacts of climate change, such as shifting weather patterns and catastrophic floods (Baron et all, 2022).Unfortunately, these impacts are projected to escalate, with forecasts suggesting that climate-related events, environmental degradation, and air pollution may cause Pakistan's GDP to shrink by 18-20% by 2050. PDF Climate change in rural Pakistan: evidence and experiences from a ence climate impacts in unique ways. While there is a large volume of studies about impacts of climate change, there is a dearth of studies that shed light on people's diverse percep-tions and experiences (Ayeb-Karlson et al. 2016). This paper studies the impacts of climate change in Pakistan through people's accounts of their lived ... Pakistan's Most Terrifying Adversary Is Climate Change Pakistan's current government is speaking about climate change, but it is a conversation that has come too late, unaccompanied by serious action. In 1947, Pakistan was 33 percent forest . Pakistan Urgently Needs Significant Investments in Climate Resilience ISLAMABAD, Nov. 10, 2022—Climate change-induced disasters could significantly set back Pakistan's development ambitions and its ability to reduce poverty. To foster people-centric climate adaptation and resilience, the country needs fundamental shifts in its development path and policies, requiring substantial investments including international support, according to the World Bank Group ... Climate Change Linked to Pakistan's Floods, Study Finds Floodwaters in Sohbatpur, a city of roughly 200,000 in southern Pakistan. Zahid Hussain/Associated Press. Pakistan's highly varied topography, from its southern coast to the high Himalayan peaks ... Climate Change and Water Crises in Pakistan: Implications on Water This study explores the impacts of climate change on the availability, usage, and storage of water in Pakistan. The drought and floods of year 2022 have been taken as case study for analyzing the impacts of climate change across Pakistan by sampling both rural and urban areas. Figure 1 shows the sectoral usage of available water in Pakistan. Climate change in Pakistan Climate change may have been a contributing factor to the severity of the 2010 Pakistan floods.. Climate change in Pakistan is a major issue for the country. Pakistan is highly vulnerable to climate change.As with the changing climate in South Asia as a whole, the climate of Pakistan has changed over the past several decades, with significant impacts on the environment and people. [1] Human, economic, environmental toll of climate change on the rise: WMO Extensive flooding in Pakistan caused by severe rainfall in July and August last year killed over 1,700 people, while some 33 million were affected. ... Environmental impacts of climate change are another focus of the report, which highlights a shift in recurring events in nature, "such as when trees blossom, or birds migrate". ... Pakistan: Photo essay depicting life in one of world's hottest cities Ahead of the pivotal COP26 climate conference, a new photo essay from Amnesty International documenting the lives of the citizens of Jacobabad - one of the world's hottest cities - offers a stark illustration of the human rights impact of climate change and underscores the immediacy of the climate crisis for some of the world's poorest ... Environment and Climate Change The cumulative effects of climate change directly impact the economy, costing the country an estimated USD 38 billion annually (WB and ADB 2021). If this trend continues, it will reverse human development gains made over the last decade. Already, in 2020 Pakistan ranked 154 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index ... Climate change: causes, outcomes in Pakistan and a way forward Climate change has caused drastic effects in the world climate, such as the rise of carbon dioxide level, global temperature, melting of ice sheets, rise of sea levels, and ocean acidification. Pakistan's Climate Challenges Pose a National Security Emergency Pakistan should treat these climate disasters as a full-fledged national security emergency before they stoke conflict that adds further stress amid the country's other numerous challenges. Displaced survivors of the floods in Pakistan near the village of Shahdadkot on Aug. 23, 2010. Over the last 20 years, over 10,000 Pakistanis have lost ... How Pakistan floods are linked to climate change Pakistan has more glacial ice than anywhere outside the polar regions The devastating floods in Pakistan are a "wake-up call" to the world on the threats of climate change, experts have said. The ... PDF The challenge of climate change and policy response in Pakistan Abstract Climate change is expected to have adverse impact on Pakistan. This is ironical for a country, which ranks 135th in the world in terms of global green house gases (GHG) emissions per capita, but ranks 16th in terms of vulnerability to climate change. Climate change poses a major threat to all dimensions of sustainable development Reducing climate change impacts from the global food system through Food choices impact both our health and the environment 1,2.The food system is responsible for about one-third of global anthropogenic GHG emissions 3,4 and climate goals become unattainable ... The Climate Change Crisis in Pakistan Climate change is no longer a distant threat; it's an urgent crisis impacting lives across the globe, and Pakistan is no exception. As a country with a diverse climate and a significant portion of its population dependent on agriculture, Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Climate change: a real threat to Pakistan Changes in temperature, rainfall, and extreme weather have increased the frequency and affected agriculture production and patterns. The report referred to the flood damages to crops in Pakistan ... Climate Change and its impacts in Pakistan Pakistan faces "significantly higher average temperatures than the global average, with a potential rise of 1.3°C-4.9°C by the 2090s over the 1986-2005 baseline," according to a study, which ... Global Climate-Change Impact Studies Centre Global Climate-Change Impact Studies Centre is a dedicated research institute for climate change studies in Pakistan. The Centre is mandated for national level R&D effort, capacity building, policy analysis, information dissemination and assistance to national planners and policymakers on issues related to past and projected future climatic changes in the country, their likely impacts on the ... When will climate change turn life in the U.S. upside down? Climate change's impacts will be highly asymmetric. As climate scientist Michael Mann explains in his latest book, "Our Fragile Moment," great climate science communicator Stephen Schneider once said, "The 'end of the world' or 'good for you' are the two least likely among the spectrum of potential [climate] outcomes." So ... Impact of climate change on electricity demand: a case study of Pakistan N2 - The energy sector is sensitive to changing weather patterns and Pakistan is one of those countries where temperature rise induced by climate change is expected to be above the world average. In this backdrop the present study aims at finding the impact of climate change on electricity demand in Pakistan at the regional and national level. Investing in Climate Adaptation under Trade and Financing Constraints Financially constrained governments, particularly in emerging and developing economies, tend to face a fiscal trade-off between adapting to climate change impacts and pursuing broader development goals. This trade-off is especially relevant in the agriculture sector, where investing in adaptation is critical to ensure food security amidst climate change. International trade can help alleviate ... Climate Change in Nigeria: Impacts and Responses There are a few comprehensive reports and papers that provide useful evidence and discussion of the various impacts of climate change throughout Nigeria. The vast majority of the literature that provides evidence of climate change impacts and responses, however, focuses on the agricultural sector and on individual farming communities in ... assignment essay homework phd report resume review speech thesis