thesis statement for hurricane katrina

Hurricane Katrina Essay

Hurricane Katrina was one of the deadliest and most destructive hurricanes to ever hit the United States. The storm made landfall on August 29, 2005, causing widespread damage across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In all, more than 1,800 people lost their lives and tens of billions of dollars in property damage was done.

Katrina was particularly devastating for the city of New Orleans, which saw its levees fail and floodwaters inundate much of the city. In the aftermath of the storm, many residents were left stranded without food or water for days.

The response to Hurricane Katrina was widely criticized, with many people pointing to the slow federal response as a major failing. In the years since, however, much has been done to improve disaster response in the United States. Hurricane Katrina was a tragic event that will be remembered for years to come.

Our environment and ecosystem allow us to thrive and enjoy our planet. Natural catastrophes are not affected by man’s will or desire. They might happen at any time and in any place, but we may choose how to protect our environment by acting responsibly for these natural disasters.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history. It hit the Gulf Coast region on August 29th, 2005 and caused catastrophic damage, particularly in the city of New Orleans and the state of Mississippi. The hurricane killed over 1,800 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more.

The physical damage from Hurricane Katrina was widespread and devastating. Entire neighborhoods were leveled, leaving nothing but debris behind. Houses were torn from their foundations, trees were uprooted, and cars were thrown about like toys. Floodwaters inundated entire communities, causing even more damage as they rose and receded. In all, it is estimated that Hurricane Katrina caused over $100 billion in damage.

But the damage from Hurricane Katrina was not just physical. The storm also had a profound psychological effect on those who lived through it. Many people who survived the hurricane recounted feeling traumatized by their experiences. They described a sense of loss, displacement, and grief that was overwhelming. For many, the stormrepresented not just the destruction of their homes and belongings but also the loss of their community and way of life.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there was a great deal of discussion about how to rebuild the affected communities. Some argued that it was important to rebuild as quickly as possible in order to restore a sense of normalcy for residents. Others argued that rebuilding should be done thoughtfully and with an eye towards creating more resilient communities that could better withstand future storms.

What is clear is that Hurricane Katrina was a major disaster with far-reaching implications. The physical and psychological damage caused by the storm will be felt by those who lived through it for many years to come.

The aquatic ecosystem of the nearby lakes was devastated by the levee failure in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The breach of the dikes caused water to rapidly flood the region and become contaminated with city sewage, chemicals, medical waste, and human remains, which were then pumped into the lakes.

The main body of water effected was Lake Pontchartrain which provides much of the city’s drinking water. The hurricane also destroyed the coastal wetlands which act as a natural buffer from storms, these wetlands have not yet recovered.

New Orleans is situated in a bowl-shaped area surrounded by levees that protect it from flooding. The bowl is actually below sea level, so when Hurricane Katrina hit on August 29, 2005, and the levees failed, the entire city was flooded. More than 80% of New Orleans was under water, with some areas being submerged under 20 feet of water.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many people were left stranded without food or clean water. As conditions in the city deteriorated, looting and violence became widespread. The federal government was criticized for its slow response to the disaster.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the deadliest and most destructive hurricanes in US history. It caused more than $100 billion in damage, and left thousands of people homeless. More than 1,800 people were killed, making it one of the deadliest natural disasters in US history.

Water bearing all sorts of pollutants was pumped into any available destination, as long as it didn’t submerge the city, after Katrina. Apart from Katrina causing havoc, one of the most significant flaws in government and army Corps of Engineers efforts was the lack of protection and efficiency of the levees. The consequences of the levees’ failure and water eventually engulfing the city were only amplified.

The water that submerged New Orleans following Katrina was filled with all types of contaminants. Oil from cars and boats, animal carcasses, and even human remains were all mixed in the murky water. This water not only destroyed homes and buildings, but also seeped in to the soil and groundwater. The long-term effects of this contaminated water are still being studied, but it is safe to say that they will be felt for many years to come.

In addition to the contaminated water, there was also a great deal of air pollution caused by Katrina. As the storm ripped through houses and buildings, it generated a tremendous amount of dust and debris which contained harmful toxins like asbestos and lead. This debris was then sent airborne where it was inhaled by residents, further exacerbating the health problems caused by the storm.

All of this pollution had a devastating effect on the environment of New Orleans. The contaminated water destroyed plant and animal life, as well as the natural habitats that they lived in. The air pollution tainted the air quality for miles around, making it difficult for people and animals to breathe. And the debris left behind clogged up waterways and made it difficult for new vegetation to grow. It will take many years for the environment of New Orleans to recover from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.

We must recognize that the traditional “levee solution” is more detrimental than beneficial, and it must be rethought. According to the Association of State Floodplain Managers, “There are only two kinds of levees: ones that have failed and ones that will fail.” To protect and safeguard our ecosystems more effectively, levi structure and design must be significantly altered.

We have to think long-term when it comes to these things. In 2005, one of the most infamous natural disasters occurred in the United States. Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi hard, causing many fatalities and leaving thousands homeless. This hurricane was different than any other because of the widespread damage that it did.

It is important to note that while hurricanes are a common occurrence in this area, the devastation caused by Katrina was Unprecedented. In order to understand how such destruction could happen, we must first understand what goes into making a hurricane and the different types of storms.

A tropical cyclone is “a rotating, organized system of clouds and thunderstorms that originates over tropical or subtropical waters” (National Hurricane Center). These storms are fueled by warm, moist air and can grow to be very large. There are three main types of tropical cyclones: tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes.

A tropical depression is the weakest type of storm and has winds that range from 22-38 mph. A tropical storm is a bit stronger, with winds reaching 39-73 mph. The last and most severe type of storm is the hurricane. These storms have winds that surpass 74 mph and can cause catastrophic damage (National Hurricane Center).

Now that we know what goes into making a hurricane, we can begin to understand how Katrina formed. The conditions for this particular hurricane were just right; it had all of the necessary ingredients to turn into a category 5 storm.

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The Unconventional Narrative of Hurricane Katrina: a Deeper Dive

This essay is about exploring Hurricane Katrina from a unique perspective, delving beyond conventional narratives of disaster. It discusses the storm’s profound societal impacts, highlighting systemic inequalities and failures exposed in its wake. The essay emphasizes the resilience of affected communities, the need for equitable recovery efforts, and the call for reimagined disaster response strategies. Ultimately, it urges a shift towards more inclusive governance and sustainable practices to address the lingering challenges and foster a future defined by justice and resilience for all At PapersOwl, you’ll also come across free essay samples that pertain to Hurricane Katrina.

How it works

Hurricane Katrina, a catastrophic event that struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, is often painted as a story of devastation and recovery. However, peeling back the layers reveals a narrative that diverges from the norm. This essay embarks on a journey to unearth the less explored facets of Hurricane Katrina, shedding light on its broader implications beyond the surface-level destruction.

Katrina’s impact transcended mere physical ruin; it laid bare the entrenched socio-economic disparities festering within the region. The storm disproportionately targeted marginalized communities, shining a spotlight on systemic issues of race, poverty, and environmental injustice.

The breach of levees and flood protection systems, exacerbated by insufficient investment in infrastructure, served as not just a natural disaster but also a testament to governance failures and societal neglect.

In the aftermath of Katrina, tales of resilience emerged, illuminating the strength and solidarity inherent in affected communities. Everyday individuals morphed into unsung heroes, spearheading rescue missions and extending a helping hand to those in distress. Grassroots movements and volunteers emerged as unsung heroes, driving the recovery efforts forward and showcasing the potency of collective action in times of turmoil.

Yet, the Katrina saga isn’t merely a saga of triumph; it’s also one fraught with missed chances and lingering dilemmas. Despite promises to rebuild with greater resilience, many communities continue to grapple with inadequate housing, economic strife, and mental health challenges. The sluggish and unequal pace of recovery underscored the enduring disparities that existed long before the storm’s fury descended upon the land.

Moreover, Katrina prompted a reassessment of conventional disaster response paradigms. It laid bare the inadequacies of centralized, top-down approaches and underscored the importance of community-driven initiatives and localized knowledge. The call for more inclusive and equitable strategies reverberated loudly, urging policymakers to prioritize the needs of the most marginalized segments of society.

Looking towards the horizon, the legacy of Katrina beckons as a clarion call for systemic transformation. It urges us to reimagine our relationship with the environment, placing emphasis on sustainability and resilience. It demands heightened investment in social infrastructure and economic opportunities for marginalized communities. It compels a shift towards more egalitarian governance structures that empower communities to chart their own destinies.

In summation, Hurricane Katrina transcends the confines of a conventional disaster narrative; it serves as a poignant societal awakening. It lays bare the fault lines of inequality and injustice entrenched within our societal fabric, beckoning us to confront them with courage and conviction. By embracing this unconventional perspective, we can glean invaluable lessons from the past and endeavor towards a future defined by justice and resilience for all.

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Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation Essay

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Recently, natural disasters have been occurring more and more often, which claim the lives of millions of people. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the southern United States on August 29, 2005, became one of the most devastating natural disasters in the history of the country. Then, having weakened to a tropical storm, the hurricane turned towards the Gulf of Mexico. The storm quickly recovered to a hurricane in the southeastern part of the Gulf. Natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina caused great damage to the population and affected all spheres of life.

When the hurricane turned to the Gulf of Mexico, the management of the oil platforms announced the evacuation of workers. In New Orleans, the evacuation was announced on Sunday, August 28 (Raulji et al., 2018). Panic broke out in the city, thousands of cars flooded the highways, and traffic jams formed. But before leaving, people tried to stockpile on plenty of water, food, and fuel, so huge queues formed in stores and gas stations. 80% of the population – about 1 million people – left New Orleans and the suburbs (Raulji et al., 2018). Thousands of city residents were below the poverty line; they could not afford to go to a safe place and stay in a hotel. City transport suspended work, making it difficult to leave the dangerous region without a personal car.

There were 150 thousand people left in the city. The city administration offered them an indoor stadium as a shelter used for football, baseball, and basketball games. 30 thousand citizens found shelter in it (Raulji et al., 2018). The greatest danger is hanging over the residents of New Orleans. The townspeople were threatened by a powerful wind that tore off the roofs of houses and by flooding; 70% of the city is located below sea level (Raulji et al., 2018). Dams were working in the vicinity of the city, which was breached by an 8-meter storm surge in several places. Streams of water flooded the city streets. Single-story houses in some areas were flooded with roofs (Raulji et al., 2018). A whirlwind swept over the water, the speed of which exceeded 200 km / h. The wind damaged the stadium’s roof and destroyed thousands of houses.

The rescue of people and the elimination of consequences began on August 29. In September, there were rumors in the press that tens of thousands of people became victims of the hurricane and the subsequent flooding, but the speculation was not confirmed. The death toll was 1,836 residents of the United States (Rohland, 2018). Employees of the National Guard, Coast Guard officers, and army soldiers worked at the scene, the total number of which reached 65 thousand people (Rohland, 2018).

Residents of the affected regions were granted benefits, released from debts, and allowed to use pension savings ahead of schedule. But in general, the actions of President George W. Bush in preparation for the hurricane and the measures taken to eliminate the consequences caused distrust and condemnation among more than half of the US residents. Photos of flooded New Orleans and destroyed towns on the Gulf Coast flew around the world. However, flooding and damaged infrastructure were only the primary consequences of the hurricane.

Further, residents of coastal states, especially Louisiana, faced environmental and social problems. The hurricane caused manufactured accidents. Experts recorded oil leaks, the total volume of which was estimated at 8-9 million gallons (Rohland, 2018). Later, toxic substances from Lake Pontchartrain penetrated the Gulf of Mexico. Analysis of urban soil showed contamination with benzene, lead, and formaldehyde. Victims and survivors of the hurricane often have respiratory diseases called “Katrina’s cough”(Rohland, 2018). Doctors indicate that the acquired symptoms resulted from living in a territory contaminated with toxic substances.

After the tragic events, many people with mental disabilities were recorded in New Orleans. There were not enough specialized institutions, and potential patients of psychiatric hospitals became involved in crimes. The city was already considered one of the most criminogenic in the state, but after the devastating hurricane, the percentage of robberies and violence in New Orleans increased. Looters smashed up stores, acting with complete impunity. A state of emergency was introduced in the city. The police and the National Guard have received permission to use weapons against criminal elements.

The geographical location of New Orleans is one of the main reasons for this kind of natural disaster. Residents of the city feared anything but flooding. Most of New Orleans is located below sea level, and numerous dams and powerful pumping stations are designed to pump out excess water. However, the force of Katrina was so powerful that the dams could not withstand the pressure and were damaged at 53 points (Rohland, 2018). Water gushed out of the lake from where it was not supposed to.

In conclusion, Hurricane Katrina affected all spheres of human activity. The state could not recover from the disaster for a long time, as many buildings were destroyed, and hospitals were overflowing with victims. People should learn lessons and how to prevent events that lead to large-scale deaths of citizens and monstrous environmental consequences. To prevent such disasters in the future or at least try to minimize the damage they caused, it is necessary to identify the factors that caused the hurricane.

Raulji, C., Velez, M. C., Prasad, P., Rousseau, C., & Gardner, R. V. (2018). Impact of Hurricane Katrina on healthcare delivery for New Orleans patients, 2005–2014. Pediatric Blood & Cancer , 65 (12), e27406. Web.

Rohland, E. (2018). Adapting to hurricanes. A historical perspective on New Orleans from its foundation to Hurricane Katrina, 1718–2005. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change , 9 (1), e488. Web.

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IvyPanda. (2023, November 24). Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation. https://ivypanda.com/essays/hurricane-katrina-and-its-effect-on-the-nation/

"Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation." IvyPanda , 24 Nov. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/hurricane-katrina-and-its-effect-on-the-nation/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation'. 24 November.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation." November 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/hurricane-katrina-and-its-effect-on-the-nation/.

1. IvyPanda . "Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation." November 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/hurricane-katrina-and-its-effect-on-the-nation/.

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IvyPanda . "Hurricane Katrina and Its Effect on the Nation." November 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/hurricane-katrina-and-its-effect-on-the-nation/.

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Hurricane Katrina as Environmental Injustice

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Hurricane katrina: analyzing a mega-disaster.

• Arjen Boin , Arjen Boin Department of Public Institutions and Governance, Leiden University
• Christer Brown Christer Brown European Commission
•  and  James A. Richardson James A. Richardson Public Administration Institute, Louisiana State University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1575
• Published online: 28 February 2020

The response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has been widely described as a disaster in itself. Politicians, media, academics, survivors, and the public at large have slammed the federal, state, and local response to this mega disaster. According to the critics, the response was late, ineffective, politically charged, and even influenced by racist motives. But is this criticism true? Was the response really that poor? This article offers a framework for the analysis and assessment of a large-scale response to a mega disaster, which is then applied to the Katrina response (with an emphasis on New Orleans). The article identifies some failings (where the response could and should have been better) but also points to successes that somehow got lost in the politicized aftermath of this disaster. The article demonstrates the importance of a proper framework based on insights from crisis management studies.

• Hurricane Katrina
• U.S. disaster response
• New Orleans
• strategic crisis management
• crisis leadership
• crisis analysis

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Communication Theses

Hurricane katrina and the third world: a cluster analysis of the "third world" label in the mass media coverage of hurricane katrina.

Paul E. Mabrey III

Date of Award

Degree type, degree name.

Master of Arts (MA)

Communication

First Advisor

Dr. Carol Winkler - Chair

Second Advisor

Dr. Mary Stuckey

Third Advisor

Dr. David Cheshier

Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, the Gulf Coast and the United States in August of 2005. While an emerging literature base details the consequences and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, a critical missing piece for understanding Hurricane Katrina American landfall is a rhetorical perspective. I argue a rhetorical perspective can significantly contribute to a better understanding of Hurricane Katrina’s implications for creating policy, community and identity. As a case study, I employ Kenneth Burke’s cluster analysis to examine the use of the label “Third World” to describe New Orleans, the Gulf Coast and the United States in the mass media coverage of Hurricane Katrina.

https://doi.org/10.57709/1061321

Recommended Citation

Mabrey III, Paul E., "Hurricane Katrina and the Third World: A Cluster Analysis of the "Third World" Label in the Mass Media Coverage of Hurricane Katrina." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2009. doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1061321

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Disaster Mythology and Fact: Hurricane Katrina and Social Attachment

a Center for Health Protection, Arkansas Department of Health, Little Rock, AR

Anthony R. Mawson

b Division of Genetics and Epidemiology, Department of Pediatrics, University of Mississippi Medical Center, Jackson, MS

Marinelle Payton

c College of Public Service, Jackson State University, Jackson, MS

John C. Guignard

d Guignard Biodynamics, Metairie, LA

Misconceptions about disasters and their social and health consequences remain prevalent despite considerable research evidence to the contrary. Eight such myths and their factual counterparts were reviewed in a classic report on the public health impact of disasters by Claude de Ville de Goyet entitled, The Role of WHO in Disaster Management: Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (Geneva, World Health Organization, 1991), and two additional myths and facts were added by Pan American Health Organization.

In this article, we reconsider these myths and facts in relation to Hurricane Katrina, with particular emphasis on psychosocial needs and behaviors, based on data gleaned from scientific sources as well as printed and electronic media reports. The review suggests that preparedness plans for disasters involving forced mass evacuation and resettlement should place a high priority on keeping families together—and even entire neighborhoods, where possible—so as to preserve the familiar and thereby minimize the adverse effects of separation and major dislocation on mental and physical health.

Misconceptions about disasters and their social and health consequences abound, despite considerable research evidence to the contrary. Eight such myths and their factual counterparts were reviewed in a classic report on the public health impact of disasters by de Ville de Goyet 1 and two additional myths were added by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and subsequently listed by Noji. 2 This article reconsiders these myths and facts in relation to the known impact of Hurricane Katrina, with particular emphasis on psychosocial needs and behaviors.

Katrina was the deadliest hurricane since 1900—when a hurricane hit Galveston, Texas—and it was the costliest natural disaster on record in the United States. 3 The hurricane made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, on August 29, 2005, as a strong Category 3 hurricane. The 125-mile-per-hour winds and storm surge virtually obliterated entire coastal communities in its wake. More than 1,300 people died as a direct result of the storm and subsequent floods, 700,000 were displaced, and about 273,000 people were evacuated to shelters. 4

Hurricane Katrina was a highly complex event in terms of its overall impact, due to the interaction of natural forces and the engineering failure of man-made storm and flood protection structures, notably in New Orleans. High winds and flooding destroyed homes, businesses, and health infrastructure across a 90,000-square-mile area of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and the Florida Panhandle. 3 Storm-induced breaks in the levee system surrounding New Orleans caused rapid and deep flooding in more than 80% of the city.

The disaster was compounded 26 days later when Hurricane Rita made landfall near the Texas-Louisiana border, forcing the cessation of hurricane response activities in New Orleans and the evacuation of coastal regions of western Louisiana and Texas. The economic and health consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita extended beyond the Gulf region and continue to affect states and communities adversely throughout the country. 5 The aggregate monetary costs of Katrina in Orleans Parish alone are estimated at $40 to $50 billion, including direct property losses, continuing economic losses, and emergency assistance. 6 The data for this article were gleaned from scientific sources as well as printed and electronic media reports on Hurricane Katrina and its sequelae.

THE “MYTHS”

The 10 myths and facts on disasters are as follows:

• Myth #1: Foreign medical volunteers with any kind of clinical background are needed. Fact: The local population almost always provides for its own immediate health needs. Only medical personnel with skills that are not available in the affected country may be needed.
• Myth #2: Any kind of international assistance is needed immediately. Fact: A hasty response, not based on an impartial evaluation, contributes to the chaos. Most needs are met by the victims themselves and their government and local agencies, not by foreign aid workers.
• Myth #3: Epidemics and plagues are inevitable after every disaster. Fact: Epidemics seldom occur after a disaster, and dead bodies do not lead to catastrophic outbreaks of infectious diseases. Improving sanitary conditions and educating the public on hygienic measures are the best means of preventing disease.
• Myth #4: Disasters bring out the worst in people (e.g., looting, rioting). Fact: While there are isolated cases of antisocial behavior, which tend to be highlighted by the media, most people respond positively and generously.
• Myth #5: The affected population is too shocked and helpless to take responsibility for its own survival. Fact: Many people find new strength and resiliency during an emergency.
• Myth #6: Disasters are random killers. Fact: Disasters strike the most vulnerable groups hardest, i.e., minorities and the poor, especially women, children, and the elderly.
• Myth #7: Locating disaster victims in temporary settlements is the best solution to the housing problem. Fact: This is the least desirable option. The preferred strategy is to purchase construction materials and rebuild.
• Myth #8: Food aid is always required for the victims of natural disasters. Fact: Massive food aid is not usually required; natural disasters only rarely cause loss of crops.
• Myth #9: Clothing is always needed by disaster victims. Fact: Clothing is almost never needed; it is usually culturally inappropriate, and although it is accepted by disaster victims it is almost never worn.
• Myth #10: Things return to normal within a few weeks. Fact: Disasters have enduring effects and major economic consequences. International interest tends to wane just as needs and shortages become more pressing.

The present review supports the generalizations overall, but sets the behavioral observations in a context of the social attachment model of psychosocial needs and behaviors. 7 , 8 The central premises of the model are that the overriding tendency in disasters is to seek the proximity of loved ones, familiar possessions, and places (i.e., affiliation rather than “fight or flight”); these tendencies lead to altruism, camaraderie, and social solidarity at the community level rather than social breakdown, passivity, or escape; and separation from loved ones and familiars is a greater stressor than physical danger.

DISASTER MYTHS AND FACTS IN LIGHT OF HURRICANE KATRINA

Myth #1: are foreign medical volunteers needed.

As noted by de Goyet, 1 immediate lifesaving needs are almost always met by the local population rather than by outside medical volunteers. Only medical personnel with skills that are unavailable in the affected area may be needed. The U.S. government response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana was actually delayed, partly due to initial reports that New Orleans had escaped the brunt of the storm, and perhaps also due to political and bureaucratic wrangling over state and local vs. federal jurisdiction. However, short-term health and medical needs were largely met following the hurricane. In fact, in locations where overall coordination and infrastructure were lacking, attempts to provide direct care distracted attention from more urgent tasks of meeting security and other immediate needs. Many clinicians and health-care organizations self-deployed to Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina, but their arrival occasionally compounded the disorganization of health services. Physicians wrote prescriptions for hypertension and diabetes, but there were no pharmacies open or even available to fill them. Lacking an assigned role, and in the absence of communication facilities and electrical power, many volunteers were unable to meet the actual needs of victims. 9

Emergency workers from Canada, however, were the first to arrive at the Hurricane operations center in St. Bernard Parish, a New Orleans suburb of 70,000 people, on August 31, 2005. The team of 45 was warmly welcomed by the parish president, rescued 119 people from flooded homes, treated about 150 patients, saved many evacuees, and resupplied a local medical clinic before returning to Canada on September 6, 2005. 10 Only subsequently was a disaster response mobilized throughout the country, and it included volunteers from, among others, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense, the Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security, the American Red Cross (ARC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in addition to volunteers from medical facilities and groups. 11 This would tend to support de Goyet's generalization that foreign medical workers are not usually needed in natural disasters in countries where resources are adequate. But those with poor resources would clearly benefit from intervention by structured disaster response teams.

Myth #2: Is international assistance needed?

Because Hurricane Katrina destroyed businesses as well as the medical and public health infrastructure along a broad swath of the U.S. Gulf Coast, including New Orleans, assistance from federal agencies was essential. Massive aid was provided by ARC, FEMA, and other governmental and private agencies. CDC, for instance, deployed approximately 500 professionals for recovery operations. However, the severity of wind damage and flooding was shown by a survey of evacuees in Houston. Forty percent reported spending at least a day on a street or overpass waiting to be rescued, and 34% were trapped in homes. Of those trapped in their own homes, half of them waited three or more days to be rescued. Of those rescued, equal percentages (43%) were saved either by official agencies (Coast Guard, National Guard, and military) or by friends or neighbors. 12

Within 14 days after the hurricane, ARC and the Mississippi Department of Health had established case definitions of illnesses and set up a toll-free number for shelter staff to report illnesses. 13 Just two days after the hurricane, work began at the field headquarters of ARC in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The medical team deployed from ARC headquarters in Washington, DC, performed critical-needs assessments and helped define the public health response to the hurricane. Within four days, multidisciplinary and interagency ARC teams had assessed more than 200 shelters housing nearly 30,000 people and provided care to about 50,000 displaced people. These teams rapidly identified immediate and longer-term needs and developed a coordinated response plan. 9 U.S. President George W. Bush did not request foreign aid officially, but offers of aid from the United Nations and approximately 90 member countries were received by the U.S. government. 14

In New Orleans, health services were provided by Ochsner Clinic, located at the more elevated, southwestern end of the city, as well as by other local medical institutions (including Touro Infirmary in the uptown area and East Jefferson General Hospital in the suburb of Metairie) that had escaped major flooding. 15 However, local and federal assistance was hampered by a dearth of resources and infrastructure in New Orleans. For example, more than 9,000 hospital beds in New Orleans were unusable because of flooding; 8 shelters had difficulty obtaining medications; 16 and many health-care workers were themselves displaced by the hurricane. Makeshift clinics in the larger shelters had limited supplies but provided medical support. 17 On the other hand, the medical infrastructure of Gulfport, Mississippi, an area severely affected by the hurricane, was relatively intact. Patients were seen effectively in clinics, and hospitals were open with sufficient bed capacity in at least six different communities of the Gulfport region, not necessitating assistance from the NIH medical mission team. 18

These observations on Hurricane Katrina, though far from representative, support de Goyet's thesis that disaster-related needs are met by national and local governmental agencies. However, were it not for the massive resources available for mobilization within the U.S., almost any other country dealing with a hurricane on the scale of Hurricane Katrina would have required assistance.

Myth #3: Do epidemics and plagues follow disasters?

Intuitively, epidemic diseases, illnesses, and injuries might be expected following major disasters. However, as noted by de Goyet, epidemics seldom occur after disasters, and unless deaths are caused by one of a small number of infectious diseases such as smallpox, typhus, or plague, exposure to dead bodies does not cause disease. 2 , 19 Rumors to the contrary can lead to mass burials, inhibiting the identification of bodies and interfering with religiously and culturally appropriate burial practices. 19

The keys to disease prevention are excellent sanitary conditions, swift and competent response management, and public education. Cholera and typhoid seldom pose a major health threat after disasters unless they are already endemic. 19 Although there is no (or very limited) endemic potential for epidemics of cholera or measles in the U.S., 20 outbreaks of vector-borne disease and cholera have occurred after hurricanes and flooding in developing countries. 21 , 22

West Nile virus (WNV), St. Louis encephalitis, and dengue have ties to the Mississippi delta, 23 and vast areas of stagnant and tainted floodwaters following Hurricane Katrina caused concern about vector-borne diseases. But there were no reported outbreaks of these illnesses in Mississippi. 24 There were, however, reports by CDC of other infectious illnesses, including gastroenteritis (Norovirus), bacterial infection (sometimes lethal) of open wounds (Vibrio vulnificus, V. parahaemolyticus, V. cholerae, leptospirosis infections, skin abscesses and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections, WNV, and varicella). There were also reports of scabies/lice infestation and carbon monoxide poisoning, which were attributed mainly to lack of potable (or any) water; crowded, unsanitary conditions; and limited knowledge of health risks among shelter occupants.

Extensive damage to the infrastructure of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LDHH) resulted in limited opportunities for disease surveillance, although resources in Louisiana were rapidly mobilized to restore essential public health services. CDC, the LDHH, functioning hospitals, disaster medical assistance teams, and military aid stations established an active surveillance system, beginning September 9, 2005, to report post-hurricane injuries and illnesses, initiate interventions, and deliver prevention messages to residents and relief workers. 20

Myth #4: Do disasters trigger social breakdown?

It is commonly assumed that the social contract is tenuous at best and that major natural disasters and other crises trigger mass disruption, disorder, and social breakdown. While there were well-documented instances of brutal hijacking, rioting, and looting in New Orleans after the deep flooding caused by the hurricane, there were many more reports of altruism, cooperativeness, and camaraderie among the affected population. 8 , 25 , 26 The overall cooperative, prosocial, and altruistic individual and community response following Hurricane Katrina was similarly observed after the Asian tsunami of December 2004, and the July 7, 2005, terrorist bombings in London, 27 and may have been reflected in the transient 40% to 60% drop in the homicide rate in New York City after September 11, 2001. 28 In support of de Goyet's thesis, it is well documented that natural and man-made disasters are followed by increases in altruistic behavior and social solidarity. 29 – 32

Following Hurricane Katrina, many residents of Baton Rouge, for example, invited someone to stay in their home; hotels housed displaced families, extended families, and pets; and nearly every large shelter created a clinic run by local doctors and nurses. 9 At New Orleans' Charity Hospital (the Medical Center of Louisiana), people of different races, old and young, patients and providers, both rich and poor, held hands and prayed for rescue. Notwithstanding the chaos and confusion, the medical staff remained calm and communicated coherently, dispensing care and comfort. A flashlight-illuminated talent show was held in which everyone was invited to participate, including patients with masks donned to prevent the spread of tuberculosis. 25

Myth #5: Are those affected unable to take responsibility for their own survival?

Against the common misconception that disaster victims are too shocked and helpless to take responsibility for their own welfare and survival, many find new strength and resiliency during emergencies. Thousands of local volunteers spontaneously united to sift through the rubble in search of victims after the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. Most rescue work, including providing first-aid and transportation, is done by disaster victims themselves, as witnessed after the Asian tsunami in 2004, the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, and the 2005 bombing attacks in London.

Similarly, following Hurricane Katrina, despite the loss of infrastructure and power outages at some shelters, the affected population engaged in active coping behavior. 17 The medical staff of Charity Hospital maintained a disciplined schedule while electrical power was lost and food and many medications were lacking. 25 Desperately ill patients also took responsibility for their own care. 15 On the other hand, most residents of New Orleans who remained in the city were stranded by the floodwater and depended on emergency workers for rescue.

Myth #6: Do disasters kill at random?

A common misconception is that disasters tend to strike human populations at random. On the contrary, de Goyet notes that disasters typically strike more vulnerable groups the hardest, such as those on low or fixed incomes, and especially women, children, elderly, and disabled people who tend to reside in more exposed locations and have fewer resources. 6 , 33 , 34 Marginalized populations generally suffer disproportionately after environmental disasters.

Hurricane Katrina was a special case because of its enormity and severity, and its impact was felt by entire communities across the Gulf states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. However, in New Orleans, where major flooding occurred due to the levees' failure, the destroyed neighborhoods were mainly in low-lying areas that were once marsh and swampland, and housed predominantly African American residents (76%), 29% of the population having incomes below the poverty line. 35 In one notable incident, while patients and staff at a private hospital were rescued by helicopter, those at adjacent Charity Hospital could not be rescued due to practical and technical reasons. 25 , 36 Residents of affluent neighborhoods tended to evacuate in their own vehicles in response to the call for mandatory evacuation, whereas poorer citizens either lacked a means of transportation or were unwilling to leave, and many took shelter in the Louisiana Superdome or New Orleans Morial Convention Center. Others sought refuge in hospitals, nursing homes, upstairs in their own homes, or on elevated highways. 6

The 2000 U.S. Census revealed that 27% of New Orleans households (about 120,000 people) were without privately owned transportation. In a survey conducted in Houston shelters soon after the hurricane (September 10–12, 2005), more than a third of respondents reported that lack of a car or other means of transportation was their main reason for not evacuating. 12 About 75% (1 million) of residents in the greater New Orleans area evacuated, but the remaining 25% were unable or unwilling to leave. 6

Myth #7: Should disaster victims be housed in temporary settlements?

It has been said that locating disaster victims in temporary settlements is the best solution to the housing problem. To the contrary, this is the least desirable option according to de Goyet, who suggested that construction materials be purchased and homes rebuilt in the affected areas. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, however, the widespread destruction of residential neighborhoods and of shopping areas and infrastructure made immediate reconstruction impracticable, and temporary housing had to be found for the estimated 400,000 homeless evacuees from New Orleans and the coastal regions of Mississippi and Alabama. As noted, about 25% of the population remained in the area, requiring rescue and local aid in the aftermath. Tendencies to remain in disaster areas and to refuse or delay evacuation have been noted in other disasters. 37 – 39

By February 18, 2006, FEMA had provided 42,460 travel trailers and mobile homes to residents in Louisiana alone, 40 in part to encourage workers to return to their jobs and save businesses that would otherwise fail. However, many trailers were never delivered or were delivered very late or in an unusable/unsafe condition. A survey conducted on 366 displaced people to assess basic needs and health among residents of trailer parks in Louisiana and Mississippi found that shelter, transportation, security, and lack of finance were the most pressing problems since displacement; 16% reported not having enough drinking water, and only 13% of those living in areas under boil orders could comply. 41 More than 50% reported an ill adult or child in the previous two months, and parents reported that problems getting children to school were increased threefold post-displacement. Intimate partner violence rates also rose threefold above U.S. baseline rates and 50% of respondents met criteria for major depression, similar to the number of depressive disorders among prehurricane residents of the New Orleans metropolitan area. 42 Suicide rates after displacement were more than 14 times higher than baseline rates, while suicide attempt rates were more than 78 times above baseline. 41

Myth #8: Is there a need for food aid?

It is commonly thought that food aid is always required following natural disasters. According to PAHO (Personal communication, Claude de Ville de Goyet, World Health Organization [WHO], February 2008), this is not the case, as natural disasters only rarely cause loss of crops. However, crop failure is not the only situation in which food aid may be needed on a large scale in a disaster. In regard to Hurricane Katrina, many who failed to evacuate prior to the hurricane endured several days without food, if not water. 43 Ice, food, and water all had to be brought in by truck. Even in relatively unaffected areas shops and stores were closed; hence, large numbers of people had to rely on outside assistance. Distressing images were shown on television of stranded victims lacking basic necessities and exposed to human waste, toxins, and physical violence. 13 Communication breakdowns contributed to the difficulties faced by relief workers in obtaining needed supplies and services for the shelters. Most shelters on the Mississippi coast received adequate supplies of food and water, but there were concerns about the safety of drinking and showering water, wastewater disposal, and reliance on portable toilets for water in some shelters. 17

The magnitude and urgency of the need for food and potable water after the hurricane were unprecedented. The manual of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) calculates water needs based on a minimum daily requirement of 15 to 20 liters per person. ARC recommends a gallon (4.5 liters) of potable water per person per day, and a seven-day supply. Although needs may be greater in hot weather, the amount needed for 20,000 people (the number housed in the New Orleans Convention Center), based on a 15-liter requirement, translates into 300,000 liters, or about 79,000 gallons of water per day. These facts point to the importance of ensuring that required amounts of food, water (especially potable), and other essential supplies are deliverable at large and secure venues designated as staging areas, to prevent a man-made disaster from following a natural one. 19

By September 17, 2005, in Orleans Parish alone, winds and flooding had resulted in structural damage to approximately 3,800 wholesale and retail food establishments. Loss of power and floodwater in affected areas also resulted in food spoilage and contamination. Supplies of drinking water were sufficient for only about 30 days post-hurricane, and city water provided to the New Orleans' East Bank, housing about 90% of the population, was not potable. The main water treatment facility on Carrollton Avenue had low water pressure throughout the distribution system.

The USDA delivered food and nutrition assistance to states directly affected by Hurricane Katrina as well as host states. By September 22, 2005, 428,000 displaced households had applied for more than $151 million in food stamp benefits in Louisiana and Texas alone. For more than three weeks, massive food aid was provided for nearly 637,000 households by FEMA.

Pre-disaster emergency planning should include assigning responsibility to local people for maintaining critical infrastructure. For example, during Hurricane Floyd—which struck North Carolina on September 16, 1999—engineers made it possible for the Pitt County Memorial Hospital to use the Rehab Unit swimming pool as a watertight reservoir to pressurize the water system for providing potable water and flushable toilets throughout the hospital. 44

Myth #9: Is clothing needed by disaster victims?

Clothes are one of the major items donated after disasters, and clothing, along with other basic necessities, is routinely provided to disaster victims by emergency relief organizations. Yet, according to PAHO (Personal Communication, Claude de Ville de Goyet, WHO, February 2008), donated clothing is almost never needed, and although it may be accepted by disaster victims, it is almost never worn.

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the rapid and devastating flooding of New Orleans created by breaks in three levee systems led to massive losses of homes, possessions, and employment. As a result, clothing, bedding, and footwear were needed on an unprecedented scale, not only in early phases of the disaster but also as temperatures cooled and fall turned into winter. Relief agencies and many neighborhood and charity organizations collected donated clothing for evacuees, and school systems provided uniforms for children (Personal communication, Karen Quay, Director of Evacuee Resettlement, Lutheran Episcopal Services, Jackson, Mississippi, May 2006). A survey of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in Colorado by CDC in September 2005 found that 45% of households ( n =105) needed clothing, and that it was one of the most common long-term needs of evacuees. 45

Myth #10: Does life return to normal in a few weeks?

Contrary to popular misconception, disasters can have profoundly adverse effects and major economic consequences that can take months or years to overcome. A return to normalcy seldom occurs quickly. 1 International (as well as national or domestic) interest also tends to wane just as needs and shortages become more pressing. Developing countries and even relatively impoverished and economically precarious areas in generally prosperous countries can deplete most of their financial and material resources in the immediate post-impact phase of major natural disasters, so relief programs have their greatest impact when international interest declines and local needs and shortages become acute.

In the 300-year history of New Orleans, the city has had 27 major river- or hurricane-induced disasters at a rate of one about every 11 years. 46 After each event, the city rebuilt and often expanded. Figure 1 shows a plot of the reconstruction experience for one year after Hurricane Katrina and projects future reconstruction activity by using the four periods of historical experience. 6

The sequence and timing of reconstruction after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans a

a Actual experience (solid line) and sample indicators for the first year are shown along a logarithmic timeline of weeks after the disaster. The long-term projections (dashed lines) are based on an emergency period of six weeks, a restoration period of 45 weeks, and an expected tenfold increase in the duration of reconstruction compared with previous disaster experience. (Kates RW, Colten CE, Laska S, Leatherman SP. Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: a research perspective. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2006;103:14653-60.)

BNOB = Bring New Orleans Back

The adverse effects of Hurricane Katrina on the physical environment as well as business and residential infrastructure continue to be felt, and the consequences for both physical and mental health are still being documented. In some areas, relief agencies are still struggling to build sustainable procurement and distribution systems to address long-term needs.

A major health issue for displaced populations has been the reduced ability to manage preexisting or worsening chronic illness, including mental illness, which can be compounded by diminished community resources. A study of 18,000 evacuees relocated to San Antonio after Hurricane Katrina reported a substantial demand for drugs used to treat chronic conditions. Health-care encounters from September 2–21, 2005, were monitored using a patient syndromic surveillance system based on major complaints that were classified as either acute or chronic, and medication-dispensing records were collected from federal disaster relief agencies and local pharmacies. Of more than 4,000 health-care encounters, 15% were for chronic medical conditions. Of all medications dispensed, 68% were for chronic conditions, of which 39% were for cardiovascular disease. 47 Exacerbation of chronic medical conditions thus contributes importantly to the public health burden of disasters.

Chronic illness in disaster survivors can also be exacerbated by adverse weather conditions, lack of food or water, and physical or emotional trauma. Those with mental illness or disabilities, low incomes, and lack of regular access to health care are most at risk. 48 , 49 A recent survey of the 70,000 families still living in temporary housing found high levels of mental distress: rates of depression and anxiety have doubled since 2006; 68% of female caregivers and 44% of children suffer from depression, anxiety, and sleep disorders; and badly affected neighborhoods remain deserted, adding to feelings of loss and helplessness. 50

For many Katrina survivors, uncertainty and disrupted health services had enduring effects that were compounded by environmental contamination due to toxic floodwater, as well as localized threats such as fire ants, rats, and water moccasins. 13 An important post-hurricane priority has been to monitor the consequences of dumping contaminated mud and floodwater into areas surrounding the city of New Orleans. Initial tests by the EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ruled out high fecal bacteria counts and exposure to chemicals as potential causes of serious health effects. 51

Long-term support and follow-up will be needed for those psychologically traumatized by the storm and related stresses, ranging from separation from family members, pets, and possessions to perceptions (justified or imagined) of hostility or indifference on the part of officialdom or strangers in other areas to which people were summarily evacuated.

In the continuing aftermath of the disaster, competing proposals for rebuilding the health-care infrastructure, often backed by conflicting interest groups, resulted in cumbersome decision-making and slow implementation. By May 2006, the population of metropolitan New Orleans was about 24% smaller than before the hurricane, but only 15 of the 22 area hospitals were open and less than half of the usual 4,400 beds were in use. New Orleans had 3.03 hospital beds per 1,000 population before the hurricane compared with a mean of 3.26 beds per 1,000 in the U.S. as a whole. By May 2006, there were only 1.99 beds per 1,000 population and in-patient days were increased significantly ( Figure 2 ). Total hospital capacity was also reduced and fewer health-care providers were available. The Medical Center of New Orleans (formerly Charity Hospital) remains closed, forcing indigent patients to travel 75 miles to the nearest safety-net hospital in Baton Rouge; and there was confusion about which hospitals were open and what services were provided. 52

General acute patient days (December 2005 as a percentage of 2004)

Reprinted with permission from Louisiana Hospital Association. (Utilization trends, March 17, 2006 [cited 2006 Mar 18]. Available from: URL: http://www.lhaonline.org/associations/3880/files/Utilization%20Trends.pdf )

The restoration of this vital center of commerce, intermodal transportation, and culture is slowly proceeding, but questions remain about how to rebuild damaged areas of the city and its levees and wetlands, and the extent to which further catastrophic flooding can be prevented or managed. 6 , 53

This review of the public health impact of Hurricane Katrina tends to support de Goyet's generalizations about disasters, 1 except for Myths #8 and 9, regarding the need for food aid and clothing, respectively. In fact, food aid was provided by FEMA to about 637,000 households for more than three weeks. Clothing was also needed on a massive scale due to the loss of, or evacuees' protracted separation from homes, possessions, and employment related to the hurricane. Indeed, the destructive power and extent of the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was unprecedented in the U.S.

Regarding the issue of psychosocial responses to disaster, it was believed and hyped in the media that massive trauma led to the abandonment of social mores and relationships and even to violence, as people attempted to escape or to satisfy their own individual needs (Myth #4). To the contrary, studies of behavior in disaster show that the great majority of those directly affected tend to remain calm and behave in an orderly and considerate fashion. 54 , 55 However, what has been lacking to date is a conceptual framework for understanding behavior in disaster.

Although de Goyet presented his generalizations without an overall conceptual framework, his observations related to psychosocial needs and behaviors can be usefully framed in the context of the Social Attachment Model of collective responses to threat and disaster. 7 , 8 The central tenets of the model are that individuals develop attachments to other people (significant others), as well as pets, objects, and places; moreover, once these attachments are formed, individuals strive to maintain them by seeking proximity to the objects of attachment, particularly under conditions of threat or danger. Hence, the overriding tendency expected in disasters would be to seek the familiar and, in particular, the proximity of attachment objects rather than flight or passivity. Thus, increases in altruism, camaraderie, and social solidarity would tend to occur at the community level rather than social breakdown and individualism. Being in proximity to attachment figures also influences the perception of danger and reduces fear, so that in situations where individuals are physically close to their attachment figures and objects, as in community disasters, even severe environmental threats normally induce affiliation rather than flight. Indeed, separation from loved ones and familiars is generally a greater stressor than physical danger itself.

Against the view that disasters cause overwhelming self-interest and social breakdown, manifested in aggression, looting, or rioting (Myth #4), a large body of evidence indicates that the dominant response in community disasters is indeed to seek telephone and physical contact with loved ones and possessions as well as other familiar people and places (affiliative behavior). Contrary to the view that affected populations respond with shock, helplessness, and overall passivity (Myth #5), the tendency toward social affiliation also leads to a multicultural dedication to the common good, expressed in altruism, camaraderie, and social solidarity among victims, enabling many to find new strength and resiliency during the emergency and to respond positively and generously. 7 , 56 With an increasing sense of shared plight, a desire to help predominates. The greater the danger sensed by people in their familiar environment, the more likely they are to strengthen their attachments with family, friends, and neighbors, and to develop new attachments with people sharing the same environment, overriding traditional differences and barriers among people such as race, age, and socioeconomic status. The Social Identity Model of crowd behavior 57 also postulates that altruism and self-sacrifice occur when a common identity emerges among people in the same predicament, even when great risk is involved. 27

These tendencies were all in evidence during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, yet sporadic rioting and acts of violence also erupted after the hurricane at the New Orleans Superdome and other areas in the city business district. 16 , 25 , 58 These acts may have reflected separation from—or the loss of—family members and friends, devastation of homes, and disruption of community and social networks, caused by the unexpectedly sudden and intense flooding of many parts of the city.

Human beings under threat of death are not invariably motivated by a simple drive for physical safety. As noted, rather than fight or flight, the typical response to danger is to seek the proximity of familiar people and places, even if this involves remaining in or approaching danger. Official organizations often have difficulty in getting people to evacuate before disasters, partly because family ties and other attachments (home, possessions, and their safeguarding) keep individual members in the danger zone. While residents tend to remain in the disaster area, those who flee often lack attachments to the area. However, when residents are forced to evacuate, they strive strongly to do so as a group or in family units, thereby maintaining contact and proximity with familiars.

On the other hand, forcible separation and arbitrary evacuation of separated people to unknown destinations during the chaos following a major disaster would be expected to give rise to hostility and mistrust of intervening authority, as well as “officialdom” at all levels of government, from local to federal, even though the purpose of the intervention was to save lives. Evacuees also tend to orient themselves in the direction of relatives whose homes are outside the danger area, while those forced to go to official evacuation sites form clusters that partially duplicate their old neighborhoods. Affiliative behavior and interactions with family or community members often continue at a high level of intensity and frequency for years after disasters. 7 , 8

Physical danger as a whole is generally far less disturbing or stressful than separation from familiar people and surroundings. During the London bombing raids in World War II, children showed few signs of distress, even if exposed to scenes of death and violence, if they were with a parent or with schoolmates and teachers; it was only if they were separated from parents or other attachment figures under these conditions that serious psychological disturbances occurred. 59 More frequent symptoms of disturbance also occur among people who are forced to move because of damage to their homes than among those able to remain in their homes; 60 likewise, non-returning evacuees experience significantly greater anxiety, injuries, and other problems than evacuees who are able to remain in the disaster area. 61 , 62 Separation from or the loss of familiar people and surroundings also has profoundly adverse effects on mental and physical health; conversely, individuals of many species tend to remain calm and unafraid in danger situations if they are in the presence of attachment figures and objects. 63 Maintaining social attachments is thus essential for preserving mental and physical health and overall well-being. Indeed, the literature on disaster suggests that the greater the loss of the familiar social and physical environment, the greater is the adverse impact on mental health and social adjustment. 6 , 64

Following Hurricane Katrina, only about 50,000 people went to shelters. Consistent with the social attachment model, 7 most of the nearly one million displaced people went to the homes of family and friends or stayed together in hotels. 65 Evacuees in temporary housing reportedly moved 3.5 times on average after the storm, 64 adding to the burden of stress and readjustment. A psychological needs assessment of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in Houston shelters ( n =124) from September 4 to 12, 2005, showed that moderate and severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder were shown by 39% and 24% of evacuees, respectively. 66 The suddenness and extent of post-hurricane flooding in New Orleans meant that many individuals and families were separated during the hurricane, and in the aftermath it was difficult for families to be reunited. Evacuees who had to rely on emergency transport out of the city were taken to totally unfamiliar locations, and some family members were taken to different locations.

The public health importance of individual and family registration systems and of communication between authorities and evacuees was shown by the fact that 10 days after the hurricane, more than 50% of the known dialysis patients in New Orleans could not be located. A tracking program was launched by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to remedy this situation. 15 Large gathering places such as the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center were designated as initial staging points for registration and first aid and for contacting missing relatives and friends. However, these venues were suitable only for the briefest occupancy. 19

There is a major practical implication of the social attachment model regarding official policy for disaster preparedness and response: that is, a high priority should be given to keeping family members and pets united (and even entire neighborhoods where possible) during evacuation and resettlement, so as to preserve social attachments and thereby minimize the adverse effects of separation on mental and physical health. To that end, training programs could usefully be developed for first responders and volunteer aid organizations. Such programs would provide information on the importance of social attachments in understanding how people respond to community disasters, and would offer strategies and guidelines for respecting and helping to maintain social attachments in the affected population in the event of major disasters. In fact, many states have developed State Animal Response Teams to deal with issues of providing temporary housing for pets with or near their owners, recognizing the vital importance of pets to their owners, and the fact that many owners will refuse to evacuate without them.

This research was supported in part by grant #5P20-MD00534-02 from the National Institutes of Health/National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities (Marinelle Payton, MD, PhD, MS, MPH, Principal Investigator, Center of Excellence in Minority Health, School of Allied Health Sciences, College of Public Service, Jackson State University, Jackson, Mississippi).

• Understanding Katrina

What Katrina Teaches about the Meaning of Racism

To what extent was West’s statement fair? More generally, what would it mean to ascribe the racial profile of Katrina’s victims to “racism”? This essay will argue that the debate over the racial meaning of Katrina exposes a public disagreement in the United States about the meaning of racism itself. The fundamental divide in the debate over racism in the United States today is between those who regard racism as essentially a question of  individual psychology  versus those who consider it a  social, structural  phenomenon.

One of the most fundamental problems with the discussion of racism in the United States today is the tendency (most commonly found, it must be said, on the political right and among whites) to equate racism with  racial prejudice . People of this persuasion define racism as being identical to (and, crucially, limited to)  ethnophobia —that is, disdain for other people on the basis of their supposed racial characteristics. In this definition, racism is not a social condition but rather is something that exists  in the minds of “racists.”

It is widely and correctly observed that this sort of racial prejudice, or bigotry, has abated greatly in this country in the last half century. Though racial prejudice certainly still exists, many fewer people despise others simply because of their skin color. This is true not only in terms of a reduction of the number of bigots, but also in terms of a steady restriction of the social arenas in which prejudice manifests itself. Even subtle displays of bigotry are today widely regarded as illegitimate not just in the political arena, but also at work or even in social circles. For example, while many whites may still cavil at their daughters marrying a black man, the vast majority of whites no longer actively or even passively refuse to work alongside people of color; and that someone might be refused service on public transportation because of their skin color is unimaginable. It is precisely this tabooification of active racial hatred that leads some to believe that racism is no longer a significant problem for American society.

It is impossible to overstate what huge progress the curbing of bigotry represents for the United States. But if rolling back bigotry is a necessary condition for eliminating racism, it is arguably not a sufficient condition. This is precisely the fulcrum of the political debate in this country today about racism.

The problem with equating racism with prejudice is that it fails to address the fact that  racial discrimination takes place not merely through intentional (though perhaps unselfconscious) interactions between individuals, but also as a result of deep social and institutional practices and habits.  That is, historical patterns of race-based exclusion do not disappear in lock-step with the diminishment of the chthonic prejudices that underpinned the original race-based exclusions. Long after white people cease to actively hate and consciously discriminate against racial minorities, there persist social patterns—where people live, which social organizations they belong to, what schools they attend, and so on—that were built during the hundreds of years where active racial prejudice was the fact of ethnic life in America. These social and institutional structures, in other words, are constructed on prejudicial racialist foundations. As such, they are bearers of the racist past, even though they may today no longer be populated by active bigots. This social and economic exclusion on the basis of race is what “racism” is really all about.

The continued exclusion of blacks from certain prestigious, purely social organizations is the archetype for this sort of racism. Consider the illustrative archetype of the all-white country club. The barrier to entry for blacks into these sorts of institutions is rarely an active  rule banning blacks from joining. 2 Rarely, but hardly never. The popularization of televised golf championships, ironically, has spotlighted the continued existence of statutorily all-white country clubs in the United States. See “Golf’s host clubs have open-and-shut policies on discrimination,” USA Today ,  April 9, 2003 . However, these exceptions prove the rule: whenever the media shines a spotlight on these statutes, the institutions almost invariably cave in and eliminate the exclusionary rules—but the elimination of the  rules  only rarely result in changes to the actual  membership of these bastions of privilege. Rather, what excludes blacks is that the club members know few if any black people as social equals outside  the club. Now, it would be a mistake to conclude from this lack of black friends that the club members are necessarily prejudiced against black people. Rather, the club is simply an institutional manifestation of a longstanding social network of upper-class whites. For such a social set, it’s not that they’re  against  the idea of socializing with blacks (though maybe their parents or grandparents were), it’s just that  as a matter of fact they don’t  socialize with blacks. The phrase “not caring about black people” is thus both fair and accurate to describe the mentality of this social milieu. Folks in this milieu may not be bigots, but they scarcely know any black people and thus don’t pay much mind to the specific concerns and welfare of black folks. In the meanwhile, the club facilitates the making of money (within their narrow social circle), the reproduction of the elite (within the same narrow social circle), and thus generally works to assure the social replication of the longstanding racialist pattern,  all without a discriminatory thought ever entering anyone’s head.

Moreover, it should be stressed that racism can replicate itself merely via an unwillingness to challenge these racialized institutions and patterns. Undoubtedly the majority of white Americans regard themselves as post-prejudicial; yet many continue to consider the impact of racialist patterns of exclusion as something that the individual victims of those patterns must take individual responsibility for redressing. 3 See the recent Pew Poll’s survey of the huge opinion gap between whites and blacks about whether or not the government response would have been better if most of the victims had been white: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=255 The result is a huge gap between blacks and whites in their understanding of the racial meaning of Katrina: for blacks, the disproportionate blackness of Katrina’s victims is a sign of how the plight of their community is systematically ignored by the government; whereas the large majority of whites consider the racial issue as more or less irrelevant. 4 In fact, there were some who even claimed that to raise the issue of the race of the victims was itself “racist,” underscoring the way some regard the individual consciousness  of race, rather than the  social practice of racial exclusion, to be the essence of racism. (A less comfortable example for the average reader of this essay might be the challenge of making “diversity hires” at elite universities: when someone on the search committee insists that there simply are no qualified minority candidates for a given position, this argument is far less likely to be the result of active prejudice than it is to derive from an unwillingness to challenge a process that at every step imposes race-tinged filters.)

It cannot be repeated often enough that racial exclusion, e.g. racism, today happens not so much through active bigotry as it does through the tacit exclusions created by these sorts of unstated, unconsidered social habits. The fundamental point is one that is deeply uncomfortable for large sectors of this country: if your social network is, for purely historical reasons, defined by color lines that were drawn long ago in a different and undeniably widely bigoted age, then  you don’t have to be a bigot yourself to be perpetuating the institutional structures of racial exclusion, e.g. racism. This was exactly Illinois Senator Barack Obama’s point when he declared on the Senate floor that the poor response to Katrina was not “evidence of active malice,” but merely the result of “a continuation of passive indifference.” 5 “Statement of Senator Barack Obama on Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” September 6, 2005 . These structural exclusions matter very much for one’s total life opportunities, including crucially one’s economic opportunities…and thus greatly affect one’s opportunities to, say, escape from deadly hurricanes.

The social definition of racism underpins the argument that while anyone can be prejudiced or bigoted toward anyone else on account of their skin color (including blacks who hate whites), rac ism  is something that only applies to blacks and other ethnic minorities. Since racism is a matter of racially-coded social exclusion from positions of power, and since white people are not  systematically  so excluded, white people cannot be victims of racism. Yes, a white person can be a victim of bigotry, and a black person can be a bigot, but it is only society itself that is racist. Individuals can only meaningfully be described as “racists” insofar as their prejudices actively perpetuate society’s racism.

When two thirds of blacks believe that “racism continues to be a problem” in this country, while two thirds of whites believe that it is not, the divide in good measure can be explained by the competing understandings of what constitutes racism. To quote the  Wall Street Journal ’s op-ed page, “For white Americans in general…as the proportion of whites who supported or were complicit in Jim Crow segregation or other racist institutions declines…the question of race becomes less fraught with every passing year.” 6 James Taranto, “The Best of the Web Today,” Opinion Journal , September 8, 2005. By contrast, black people find themselves systematically outside the centers of power and privilege, and conclude that the lovely thoughts inside white people’s heads aren’t the salient issue.

People on the right hate the argument that racism is not a matter of individual psychology but rather a social condition. They are not wrong to see that this definition flies in the face of the myth that America is a land of unlimited individual opportunity. Nor are they wrong to suspect that defining racism as larger and longer-lived than the bigotry of individuals leads  nolens volens  to the idea that ending racism requires structural reform. For if dissolving racism cannot take place simply by adjusting individuals’ “preference sets” to non-bigoted settings, then the solution to racism cannot happen exclusively in the marketplace, but instead must be mediated by an institution outside the market. Even if you haven’t read Hayek, you know where the argument is going.

The specter of Hayek raises a final point (one of no small methodological moment to the social sciences, one may observe in passing), namely that regaining progressive political possibilities requires reconstituting ideas about social collectivities; obversely, it requires dismantling Margaret Thatcher’s notorious claim that “there’s no such thing as society.” 7 Women’s Own , October 31, 1987. The whole quote: “There is no such thing as society: there are individual men and women, and there are families.” This literally anti-social perspective represents a fundamental obstacle to addressing social problems, including racism. After all, if there’s no such thing as society, then why try to solve society’s problems? Put in these terms, perhaps the dark lesson of Katrina is that much of America, and in particular the current administration, in fact does not regard the victims of Katrina as wholly belonging to the same society as them. In this sense, Kanye West’s blurted remark was entirely on the mark.

In sum, Katrina provides an unprecedented opportunity to communicate that “racism” is not just a matter of the psychology of hatred but is instead also a matter of the racial structure of political and economic inclusion and exclusion. This is one lesson from Katrina that social science should help communicate. Moreover, we should not blinker ourselves: this message is one that is deeply opposed by powerful political forces in the United States today. Those who deny the social nature of racism (whether substantively or methodologically) may not be bigots, but they are undoubtedly abettors of racism in the social sense of the word.

Nils Gilman is a high-tech executive and entrepreneur in the Silicon Valley. He is the author of Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America  (Johns Hopkins, 2003) and coeditor of  Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War  (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). He is currently working on an intellectual biography of Peter Drucker.

References:

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How photographer Frank Stewart captured the culture of jazz, church and Black life in the US

This photo, provided by Brandywine Conservancy and Museum of Art, shows Frank Stewart’s “Stomping the Blues,” taken in 1997, which is part of a retrospective celebrating the photographer’s work on display through Sept. 22, 2024, at the museum in Chadds Ford, Pa.(Collection of Rob Gibson, Savannah, via AP)

This photo provided by the Brandywine Conservancy and Museum of Art shows Frank Stewart’s “Blue Car, Havana,” which is part of a retrospective celebrating the photographer’s work on display through Sept. 22, 2024, at the museum in Chadds Ford, Pa. (Courtesy of Gallery Neptune & Brown via AP)

This photo provided by the Brandywine Conservancy and Museum of Art shows Frank Stewart’s “Katrina: Hammond B-3, 9th Ward, New Orleans,” taken in 2007, which is part of a retrospective celebrating the photographer’s work on display through Sept. 22, 2024, at the museum in Chadds Ford, Pa. (Collection of The Medium Group, LLC, courtesy of Larry Ossei-Mensah, via AP)

Photographer Frank Stewart explains some of his early works during a Friday, June 28, 2024, press preview of his exhibition at the Brandywine Museum of Art in Chadds Ford, Pa. Brandywine is the final stop for the exhibition, a retrospective of Stewart’s career documenting Black life in America and exploring cultures around the world. (AP Photo/Randall Chase)

Photographer Frank Stewart ponders a question during a Friday, June 28, 2024, press preview of his exhibition at the Brandywine Museum of Art in Chadds Ford, Pa. Brandywine is the final stop for the exhibition, a retrospective of Stewart’s career documenting Black life in America and exploring cultures around the world. (AP Photo/Randall Chase)

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CHADDS FORD, Pa. (AP) — At first glance, it looks like an aerial photo of a cemetery destroyed by war, with charred coffins ripped from broken concrete vaults and arched marble tombstones flattened by a bomb blast.

Then, the viewer begin to discern details: the coffins and vaults are actually parts of a keyboard. Instead of names and dates, the apparent tombstones are inscribed with words like “vibrato” and “third harmonic.”

“It looks like a graveyard,” photographer Frank Stewart said.

Stewart’s ghostly photograph of a New Orleans church organ ravaged by the floodwaters of Hurricane Katrina is part of a career retrospective of his decades documenting Black life in America and exploring African and Caribbean cultures.

“Frank Stewart’s Nexus: An American Photographer’s Journey, 1960s to the Present,” is on display at the Brandywine Museum of Art through Sept. 22. Brandywine is the fourth and final stop for the exhibition, which was organized by The Phillips Collection in Washington, D.C., and the Telfair Museums in Savannah, Georgia.

“I wanted to talk about the Black church and what influence they had on the culture,” Stewart said of his post-Katrina work in New Orleans. “This organ, the music and everything corresponds. It all comes together. I just wanted to show the devastation of churches and the music and the culture.”

Music is elemental to Stewart’s practice. He was the long-time photographer for the Savannah Music Festival, and for 30 years he was the senior staff photographer for Jazz at Lincoln Center Orchestra, which paired him with artistic director and Grammy-winning musician Wynton Marsalis .

“He’s like my brother,” said Stewart, whose exhibition includes “Stomping the Blues,” a 1997 photograph of Marsalis leading his orchestra off the stage during a world tour of his Pulitzer Prize-winning jazz oratorio “Blood on the Fields.”

Stewart, who was born in Nashville, Tennessee, and grew up in Memphis, Tennessee, and Chicago, has his own ties to jazz and blues. His stepfather, Phineas Newborn Jr., was a pianist who worked with the likes of musicians Lionel Hampton, Charles Mingus and B.B. King.

Describing himself as a child of the “apartheid South,” Stewart has drawn inspiration from photographers such as Ernest Cole and Roy DeCarava, who was among Stewart’s instructors at New York’s Cooper Union, where Stewart received a bachelor of fine arts degree. DeCarava’s photographs of 1950s Harlem led to a collaboration with Langston Hughes on the 1955 book, “The Sweet Flypaper of Life.”

Cole, a South African photographer, achieved acclaim in 1967 with “House of Bondage,” the first book to inspire Stewart. It chronicled apartheid using photographs he smuggled out of the country. Cole was never able to replicate his early success and fell on hard times before dying at age 49 in New York City. A documentary about him, “Ernest Cole: Lost and Found,” premiered at this year’s Cannes Film Festival.

“He came to New York and he was homeless in New York, so I would see him on the street and we would talk,” said Stewart, who is quick to draw a distinction between his work and Cole’s.

“I consider myself an artist more than a documentarian,” explained Stewart, who attended the School of the Art Institute of Chicago before enrolling at Cooper Union and was a longtime friend and collaborator of artist Romare Bearden.

That’s not to say Stewart doesn’t have journalistic instincts in his blood. He recounts a work history that includes the Chicago Defender, the largest Black-owned daily in the country at the time, and stringing for Ebony, Essence and Black Enterprise magazines. He looks back less fondly on a short stint of large-format work photographing fine art for brochures and catalogs, an undertaking he described as “tedious.”

Through it all though, Stewart has maintained an artistic approach to his work, looking to combine pattern, color, tone and space in a visually appealing manner while not leaving the viewer searching for the message.

“It has to still be ‘X marks the spot,’” he explained. “It still has to be photographic. It can’t be just abstract.”

Or maybe it can. How else to explain the color and texture seen in “Blue Car, Havana” from 2002?

“It’s all about abstract painting,” Stewart said in wall text accompanying the photo.

The retrospective shines a light on how Stewart’s work has evolved over time, from early black-and-white photographs to his more recent prints, which feature more color.

“It’s two different languages,” he said. “English would be the black and white. French would be the color.”

“I worked in color the whole time, I just didn’t have the money to print them,” he added.

While photography can inform people about the world around them, Stewart has noted there is a gulf between the real world and a photograph.

“Reality is a fact, and a photograph is another fact,” he explained. “The map is not the territory. It’s just a map of the territory.”